A DSA signature analysis and visualisation platform tailored to CTF competitions that covers three representative nonce vulnerabilities: nonce reuse, linear nonce leakage, and HNP-based lattice attacks.
Abstract
Digital signatures are fundamental to identity authentication and data integrity in cybersecurity, and the NIST-standardized Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) frequently appears in the cryptography track of CTF competitions. However, DSA relies on number theory, modular arithmetic, and large-integer computation, making both the algorithm and its associated attacks difficult for beginners to follow. Conventional tools often expose only inputs and outputs, leaving the intermediate computations of signing, verification, and key-recovery attacks opaque. This paper presents a DSA signature analysis and visualisation platform tailored to CTF competitions. The platform provides three main capabilities: basic signature generation and verification, reproduction of common CTF attack methods, and dynamic visualisation of attack workflows. It covers three representative nonce vulnerabilities: nonce reuse, linear nonce leakage, and HNP-based lattice attacks. Stepwise displays and highlighted intermediate values make the underlying computations directly inspectable. Experiments show that the platform correctly reproduces the standard DSA workflow and all three attack scenarios.
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