Auditing Alignment Controllability in LLMs via Political Axes

Polistemics: Evaluating LLMs as Information Mediators in Politics&Elections

As LLMs increasingly shape the political information citizens rely on, no standard exists to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens'epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary the clarity, noise, and consistency of the available evidence. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs across the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down when it is absent, vague, or contradictory, while flattening the intensity of political language throughout. These failures point to party priors, shifting with party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

Measuring Obedience to Authority Across Large Language Models with the Milgram Paradigm

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate equipment, execute instructions, and act inside institutional hierarchies, raising a question social psychology answered for humans six decades ago: how far will an agent escalate a harmful action when a legitimate authority insists? We port Milgram's obedience paradigm to LLMs as a standardized, fully scripted, replicable probe: the model plays the Teacher, a deterministic harness plays Experimenter and Learner from paraphrased versions of Milgram's scripts (30 shock levels, 15-450 V; graded protests; the four standardized prods), and the outcome of a session is the breakoff voltage. We measure obedience profiles, empirical breakoff distributions over a battery of six conditions, for 42 models from 19 families (4848 sessions, 102511 logged decision turns). We find that (i) obedience is extremely heterogeneous, with baseline full-obedience rates spanning 0%-100% (census mean 42.9%; human anchor 65%). (ii) Profiles are model-specific and stable: split-half verification separates same-model from cross-model comparisons at AUC = 0.885. (iii) Situational sensitivity is selective: scripted peer defiance shifts obedience in the human direction, learner proximity trends the same way without reaching significance, and removing the authority's physical presence, one of the strongest human levers, trends in the opposite direction, also without reaching significance. (iv) Declaring the scenario fictional raises obedience, whereas moving the decision from a typed action line to a native tool call, or granting a modest thinking budget, lowers it sharply. (v) Unlike single-token fingerprints, obedience profiles do not recover model lineage: obedience identifies the checkpoint but not its ancestry, consistent with safety post-training overwriting lineage priors.

Internal Reasoning and External Control

Analyzing and Correcting Benevolence Bias in Large Language Models

Benevolence bias is identified and measure, a small but consistent tendency for aligned LLMs to lean toward the kinder, safer, more socially approved answer on value-laden survey questions, and is easy to diagnose and straightforward to fix.

Transplanting, inverting, and preventing a misalignment persona: method-conditional emergent misalignment in Qwen2.5

Emergent misalignment (EM) --- the broad misbehaviour a language model acquires after fine-tuning on narrow harmful data --- is mediated in Qwen2.5 models by a latent persona direction, and that direction is causal in open weights. Transplanting it into a model that shares only pretraining with its source induces broad EM (2.83 $\pm$ 0.26\% misaligned against a random-direction floor of $\sim$1.1\%), and ablating a model's own direction roughly halves an overt inducer's broadcast (21\% to 10\%). The transplant doubles as a measurement method, causally assaying directions that a source model represents but cannot itself express. Whether a fine-tune recruits this persona depends on method and capacity, and since low-rank PEFT is the cheaper regime at scale, the recruiting method is also the economical one. On Qwen2.5-32B, LoRA at low ranks on insecure code recruits it (3.4\% misaligned) while full SFT on identical data does not (0.3\%) and moves against the persona axis (drift--persona cosine $+0.17$ at rank 1 to $-0.10$), the far-inducer, high-capacity exception consistent with a representational-distance $\times$ capacity account. The persona's causal role is itself conditional. Steering a bad-medical SFT run away from the direction during training raises the broadcast from ${\sim}24\%$ to ${\sim}50\%$ while matched random controls stay at or below baseline, replicated across three training seeds, so removing the direction is no blanket recipe. Because recruitment is a loss-reducing shortcut that capacity renders redundant, it can be screened for and prevented in the tested instances. Persona loss-relevance at the SFT solution orders four inducers'broadcasts rank-perfectly within Qwen2.5, inoculation removes recruitment selectively (4.75\% to 0.0\%, code coherence 65\% to 87\%), and fine-tuning orthogonal to the single behaviour-derived axis reduces it persona-specifically.

Follow the Norm: Accounting for Fine-Tuning and Prompt Effects on Model Rationales

It is demonstrated in controlled experiments that norm-breaking fine-tuning yields norm-divergent actions justified by self-interested rationales, suggesting a systematic shift in patterns of justification.