Legal Regulatory Dilemma and Theoretical Breakthrough of Social Collaborative Governance - Based on the Perspective of Multi-Agent Interaction

Abstract

This paper addresses the collaborative-governance deficit caused by unclear stakeholder responsibilities and disordered interactions in complex public governance scenarios. From the perspective of multi-agent interaction, it constructs a three-dimensional “stakeholder-behavior-responsibility” analytical framework. Evolutionary game models are used to simulate strategic interaction processes, social network analysis is used to describe structural relationship characteristics, and scenario simulation experiments are used to observe behavioral performance. Through the integrated analysis of strategy, structure, and behavior, the study decodes the formation mechanism and regulatory path of collaborative governance dilemmas. The results show that clear and coordinated incentive-punishment rules can increase stable cooperation probability to 92.7%, a multi-center information transmission model can improve regulatory penetration efficiency by approximately 44.5%, and a detailed procedural rule framework can shorten task completion time by about 34.0%. The study verifies that a composite research method based on interaction perspective can effectively diagnose governance gaps and optimize institutional design for substantive rule-of-law collaboration.