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A Code-Based ( k, n )-Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme with Integrity Verification

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TL;DR

It is proved that the proposed scheme satisfies correctness and perfect secrecy, thereby providing unconditional security against unauthorized coalitions while outperforming existing code-based secret sharing schemes in terms of supported secret size, scalability, and practical runtime.

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