Empirical evaluations reveal a fundamental brittleness in existing defenses: with a single trainable 7B planner, Trident reduces blue agent defensive performance by an average of 522% compared to static red agent baselines while autonomously discovering emergent behaviors such as decoy avoidance and adaptive state prioritization that static heuristics entirely fail to uncover.
Abstract
Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied. Meanwhile, recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have improved LLM reasoning, but their integration into cybersecurity remains elusive due to the absence of suitable benchmark environments and interaction datasets. To bridge this gap, we introduce Trident, an agentic LLM red teaming framework comprising three components: a dynamic benchmark with isolated sandbox servers spanning CybORG CAGE 4 and CyberWheel, a dataset comprises over 13,000 high-fidelity red-blue interaction trajectories for RLVR, and a ``Code-as-Policy''RLVR agentic architecture Trident Agentic). The latter reformulates red agent training as a contextual bandit via a tripartite Log Summarizer--Planner--Coder design, where a trainable Planner generates complete attack strategies from compressed execution logs, which a frozen Coder translates into executable Python policies deployed against live DRL defenders. Empirical evaluations reveal a fundamental brittleness in existing defenses: with a single trainable 7B planner, Trident reduces blue agent defensive performance by an average of 522% compared to static red agent baselines while autonomously discovering emergent behaviors such as decoy avoidance and adaptive state prioritization that static heuristics entirely fail to uncover.
The use of a Large Language Model (LLM) to improve autonomous defensive decision-making within an ACO environment is investigated and an online policy distillation framework is proposed that transfers the LLM's defensive policy into a lightweight RL agent containing only 64,910 parameters, reducing model size by severa...
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As cyber attacks grow more sophisticated, defenders need autonomous systems that are fast, adaptable, and explainable. Over the last decade, various strategies have been proposed for automated cyber defence (as opposed to static rule-based or signature-based), including those based on reinforcement learning (RL). Resea...
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A Large Language Model-enhanced Autonomous Reinforcement Learning Penetration Testing framework that leverages the domain knowledge embedded in a Large Language Model to perform tactical planning, thereby pruning the original action space into a compact set of candidate actions.
Assistant Professor Benjamin Lindquist studies how engineers deliberately injected randomness into early AI, giving rise to deep-learning models that sometimes hallucinate.