This survey synthesizes 257 papers spanning agent evaluation, software assurance, cyber-physical systems, runtime monitoring, and regulatory guidance in order to characterize the validation problem for agentic systems, and concludes with a lifecycle-oriented research agenda centered on bounded-autonomy specifications, adversarial trajectory generation, runtime monitoring, and audit-ready evidence structures.
Abstract
Agentic AI systems act through multi-step trajectories that combine planning, tool use, memory, interaction, and adaptation. This behavior stretches validation practice beyond component testing and one-shot input--output evaluation, because acceptable system behavior now depends on how decisions unfold over time and under changing environmental conditions. This survey synthesizes 257 papers spanning agent evaluation, software assurance, cyber-physical systems, runtime monitoring, and regulatory guidance in order to characterize the validation problem for agentic systems. The review is organized around a five-dimension taxonomy covering behavioral, safety, temporal, regulatory, and multi-agent concerns, and uses that taxonomy to map current approaches and expose recurrent coverage gaps. The analysis shows that behavioral evaluation is comparatively mature, while temporal validity, runtime evidence maintenance, regulatory legibility, and open-ended multi-agent systems assurance remain under-developed. Three cross-domain case studies (medical care, industrial operations, smart-mobility systems) provide operational illustrations of how the five taxonomy dimensions recur in safety-critical settings, grounded in the failure patterns documented in the reviewed literature. The paper concludes with a lifecycle-oriented research agenda centered on bounded-autonomy specifications, adversarial trajectory generation, runtime monitoring, and audit-ready evidence structures. The central claim is that trustworthy deployment of agentic AI depends on validating trajectories in context rather than assessing isolated components alone.
Through applied case studies in pharmaceutical discovery and financial systems, common design patterns that make agentic systems successful are analyzed, and practical mitigation strategies for failure modes are discussed, such as verification pipelines, fallback mechanisms, and human-in-the-loop supervision.
Grace Hui Yang, P. Venkit, Hooman Sedghamiz et al.· Proceedings of the 32nd ACM...· 0 citations
Large language model agents increasingly act through terminals, yet existing surveys disperse terminal-mediated behavior across software engineering, tool use, and computer-use research. We regard terminal agents as systems whose dominant progress-bearing action--observation loop is mediated by terminal command execution, textual feedback, and stateful environment interaction. Using terminal-mediated execution as an organizing lens, this survey establishes workload-level boundaries and connects system architecture, competence acquisition, and evaluation through a seven-dimensional terminal competence profile. Our synthesis shows that realized behavior is jointly shaped by the model, interface, harness, runtime, and environment. Executable trajectories ground learning in action consequences, verification, and recovery, whereas prevailing evaluations emphasize final outcomes and expose process quality, recovery, and governance unevenly. Bounded fixed-condition diagnostics illustrate two implications: benchmark families expose different process signals, and matched system comparisons reveal benchmark-dependent performance and limits of component attribution. These findings motivate explicit reporting of system and runtime conditions, supported by replayable traces and process-level evidence. The framework provides a unified basis for studying terminal-mediated agency across software engineering and emerging application domains.
Yi Bin, Xiaoyang Yuan, Hao Zeng et al.· 0 citations
Agentic artificial intelligence systems, capable of autonomous perception, planning, tool use, and multi-step action, are increasingly proposed for critical engineering domains where decisions carry physical, operational, or economic consequences. This survey addresses a gap in current literature by treating trustworthiness, whether agentic behavior can be verified, audited, and trusted under the constraints that engineering practice actually requires, as a first-class engineering property, rather than evaluating agentic AI by task capability alone. The study adopts a trustworthiness model organized around five cross-cutting dimensions: safety and constraint satisfaction; robustness and reliability; transparency and interpretability; accountability and auditability; and privacy and security. This is mapped onto an agentic assurance workflow spanning perception through audit. Building on this foundation, agentic systems architectures, threats, concrete trust mechanisms, and quantitative metrics are surveyed for direct application in agentic systems development and evaluation. These principles are then examined across four constraint-bound engineering domains: power systems, autonomous vehicles/robotics/UAVs, high-performance computing, and communication networks, identifying recurring design patterns, shared failure modes, and domain-specific gaps. Synthesizing across those domains, agentic AI trustworthiness is shown to be a single problem, with a path outlined toward a reusable, cross-domain assurance framework analogous to the graded certification regimes used by mature safety-critical engineering fields.
Omar Al-Refai, Ibrahim Shahbaz, A. Husseinat et al.· 1 citation
A unified, taxonomy-driven, and deployment-oriented survey of agentic AI systems, synthesizing recent advances through a modular reference architecture and a four-dimensional taxonomy that characterizes agents along the axes of autonomy, tool use, collaboration, and safety–governance is presented.
Sparsh Bajoria, Shreyanshu Ranjan, Adhitya M et al.· Cognitive Computation· 0 citations
Multi-drone systems are increasingly positioned for safety-critical missions such as search and rescue (SAR) and critical infrastructure monitoring. Yet, real-world adoption remains constrained not only by autonomy performance, but by the difficulty of integrating agentic behavior into professional work: operators must understand, trust, and govern automation under uncertainty, time pressure, and accountability. This position paper synthesizes the ambitions and lessons from two ongoing efforts: NAMUR, which explores LLM-supported robot control in SAR and firefighting contexts, and PERSIST, which explores persistent drone operations for monitoring and security at critical infrastructure sites. We argue that agentic AI should be approached as a socio-technical design problem, where interfaces, oversight mechanisms, and evaluation practices are as critical as algorithms. We outline a human-centered, participatory, and iterative research approach aimed at uncovering stakeholder needs, shaping agent capabilities through successive prototypes, and producing transferable proof-of-concept systems and evaluation strategies for other safety-critical contexts.
T. Merritt, Alejandro Jarabo-Peñas, Juan Bravo-Arrabal et al.· 0 citations