Authentication and key agreement scheme based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic map for blockchain-enabled UAV networks
TL;DR
The proposed AKA scheme integrating PUF and Chebyshev chaotic map constructs a three-layer security framework covering hardware security, lightweight encryption and semi-decentralized trust, which can defend against replay attacks, man-in the-middle attacks and physical node capture attacks under Tier-1 limited GCS leakage.
Abstract
Aiming at open wireless vulnerabilities, limited airborne computing resources and single-point failure risks of centralized authentication architectures in UAV swarms, this paper proposes an AKA scheme integrating PUF and Chebyshev chaotic map, which constructs a three-layer security framework covering hardware security, lightweight encryption and semi-decentralized trust. As the unique offline trust anchor, the GCS completes system initialization, blockchain deployment and UAV offline registration via secure out-of-band channels to issue UAV long-term static private keys. After the genesis block is locked, blockchains and smart contracts support GCS-independent distributed UAV-UAV authentication with tamper-evident and traceable authentication records. Formal ROR security verification and informal risk analysis jointly prove that the protocol achieves computationally bounded conditional anonymity (which alleviates identity linkability risks brought by on-chain credentials, public keys and transaction metadata) and forward secrecy under the premise that the GCS is not compromised. When the GCS suffers complete data leakage, the scheme can guarantee intra-swarm anti-impersonation mutual authentication only if adversaries cannot obtain real-time access to current on-chain public PID and CredUAV\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$Cred_{UAV}$$\end{document} alongside all UAV static private keys. The proposed protocol can defend against replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and physical node capture attacks under Tier-1 limited GCS leakage (adversaries steal GCS secrets but have no authority to query current blockchain public data). The whole authentication flow only requires two rounds of message interaction, and its computational, communication and energy overheads are significantly lower than state-of-the-art AKA protocols designed for resource-constrained UAV swarm nodes.