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Evidence Diffusion in Social Networks: a Topological Perspective

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TL;DR

It is proved that defeasible knowledge and (defeasible) ‘evidence-based distributed knowledge’ are easily lost under the diffusion of pieces of evidence in a network, whereas ‘group knowledge with distributed evidence’ is strongly robust.

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