IC-GCG: Jailbreaking Large Language Models via Intermediate Consistency Optimization
Abstract
Recent jailbreak attacks demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) can be manipulated to generate harmful outputs through adversarial prompts even after robust alignment. However, prevailing methods typically focus on forcing a desired response at the output layer—a surface-level strategy that is brittle and often fails to bypass the more fundamental safety checks embedded within the model’s internal mechanisms. In contrast, we propose intermediate consistency greedy coordinate gradient (IC-GCG), an approach that extends the GCG framework to explicitly target the model’s internal alignment mechanism. Our method forces a harmful prompt’s hidden representations to mimic those of a semantically related benign counterpart within critical middle layers. By adapting a greedy coordinate optimization strategy to craft an adversarial suffix that minimizes this representational distance, IC-GCG creates “semantic camouflag” that bypasses the model’s internal safety judgments. Experiments on several aligned LLMs indicate that IC-GCG substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, increasing the average attack success rate to 94.3% and proving particularly effective against strongly aligned models such as LLAMA2-7B-CHAT, where it boosts success by over 56 percentage points. Furthermore, the resulting suffixes display superior transferability to other models. Ablation studies confirm that this high efficacy critically depends on a strong semantic link between the harmful and benign prompt pair, empirically validating that the integrity of intermediate representations is a crucial vulnerability and highlighting the need for a new class of defenses that operate directly on the model’s internal states.