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Giulio Rossolini

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#artificial intelligence Preprint Sep 2026

Position Matters: Feature Inversion Attacks in ViT Split Inference with Token Reduction and Shuffling

Vision Transformers (ViTs) are increasingly used in split-inference systems, where edge devices transmit intermediate token representations to a remote cloud. In this setting, token reduction lowers computation and communication costs, while token shuffling disrupts the spatial organization of the transmitted tokens, potentially limiting information leakage. However, their privacy benefits remain unclear against feature inversion attacks, which attempt to reconstruct the input from the transmitted embeddings. In this work, we show that, despite disrupting the spatial structure required by conventional reconstruction attacks, transmitted token embeddings retain substantial positional information. Based on this observation, we introduce the Spatially Aligned Reconstruction Attack (SARA), a unified pipeline that predicts token positions, restores their spatial layout, reconstructs missing embeddings using a feature-space masked autoencoder, and recovers the input image. Our results demonstrate that token shuffling provides only apparent privacy, as SARA largely reconstructs the original token organization. Token reduction offers stronger protection, but significant leakage persists when the retained tokens preserve sufficient semantic and positional information. Finally, we introduce a lightweight edge-side defense that removes positional embeddings and progressively adapts the edge-side transformer blocks through knowledge distillation. It substantially reduces attack performance against SARA, while preserving downstream task accuracy and requiring no changes to the cloud-side model.

Stefano Leggio, Giulio Rossolini, Alessandro Biondi · 0 citations
Preprint Jul 2026

Adversarial Decoys: Misdirecting Attention-Based Defenses in ViT

Vision Transformers (ViTs) remain vulnerable to localized adversarial attacks, e.g., adversarial patches, while recent test-time defenses mitigate them by suppressing image tokens with abnormally high attention scores. These defenses exploit a strong coupling between attention and adversarial effectiveness: adversarial tokens often need to attract substantial attention to influence the prediction. We introduce adversarial decoys, independently optimized image patches that redirect the attention, and therefore related defenses, toward selected target tokens. Rather than jointly optimizing misclassifications and defense evasion, our approach decouples the two objectives: the original adversarial region induces the incorrect prediction, while a separate decoy manipulates the attention ranking used by the defense. A layer-wise objective increases target-token attention and promotes these tokens above competing non-target ones. Since the decoy is optimized independently of the underlying attack, the method is attack-agnostic and can be easily integrated with any existing adversarial patch attack. Experiments on ImageNet across multiple ViT architectures and attacks show that decoys can redirect high attention scores away from the true adversarial region while preserving much of the attack effectiveness. These results reveal a fundamental limitation of using attention magnitude as an indicator of adversarial relevance.

Giulia Marchiori Pietrosanti, Giulio Rossolini, Giorgio C. Buttazzo · 0 citations