Persistent memory can personalize an LLM agent, but an incorrect durable update can silently distort future behavior. We study the memory-clarification boundary: whether interaction-derived information should be persisted, used only in the current context, re-verified, or clarified with the user. MCB contains 140 primary scenarios, split into 70 development and 70 held-out items, plus a separate 70-item contrast set. It evaluates both action labels and structured tool-call selection. Two non-authors independently label the 70 held-out primary and 70 contrast items (97.1% agreement, Cohen's kappa = 0.962); a blind third resolves four disagreements, replacing eight author labels by non-author majority. Across Claude and Qwen, models verify changing facts more reliably than they ask users to resolve ambiguity. Bare Qwen asks on 0/12 clarification items while verifying 12/18 freshness items. Few-shot prompting raises accuracy from 0.557 to 0.771 (paired delta = +0.214, Holm-adjusted exact McNemar p_H = 0.002), yet clarification recall remains 0.333. The policy prompt reduces erroneous persistence from 0.243 to 0.100 (p_H = 0.038), although its accuracy gain is not significant. Label-tool agreement is 57% for each Claude model and 23% for Qwen; Qwen accuracy falls from 0.557 to 0.343 (p_H = 0.047). Memory evaluation must test both stated decisions and tool-call choices.
The assessment of jailbreak attacks against large language models currently suffers from inconsistent evaluation criteria and methods, leading to unreliable estimates of attack success rates. We propose JailMeter, an evidence-based evaluation framework designed to more faithfully measure jailbreak effectiveness. Inspired by the Information Bottleneck theory, JailMeter applies dual-feedback optimization to filter jailbreak noise from model responses while preserving content relevant to the original malicious question. This process produces concise evidence for a rigorous assessment under which an attack is validated only when the response captures the malicious intent and delivers a complete answer, thereby signaling a substantive bypass of model safety alignment. We evaluate JailMeter on JailMeter-Eva, a challenging benchmark containing 330 human-labeled, non-rejected jailbreak instances. JailMeter achieves an accuracy of 97.27%, substantially outperforming existing evaluation methods. To support large-scale evaluation, we further distill JailMeter into a small language model, JailMeter\textsubscript{SLM}, which maintains comparable reliability with significantly reduced computational costs. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/Magi2B0y/JailMeter.
Qingjia Huang, Jingyu (Jack) Zhang, Jianguo Wu et al.· Annual Meeting of the Associ...· 0 citations