Jul 2026· Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics· pp. 16006-16029· 2 citations· ⚡ 1 influential
Computer Science
TL;DR
JailMeter is proposed, an evidence-based evaluation framework designed to more faithfully measure jailbreak effectiveness and distill into a small language model, JailMeter\textsubscript{SLM}, which maintains comparable reliability with significantly reduced computational costs.
Abstract
The assessment of jailbreak attacks against large language models currently suffers from inconsistent evaluation criteria and methods, leading to unreliable estimates of attack success rates. We propose JailMeter, an evidence-based evaluation framework designed to more faithfully measure jailbreak effectiveness. Inspired by the Information Bottleneck theory, JailMeter applies dual-feedback optimization to filter jailbreak noise from model responses while preserving content relevant to the original malicious question. This process produces concise evidence for a rigorous assessment under which an attack is validated only when the response captures the malicious intent and delivers a complete answer, thereby signaling a substantive bypass of model safety alignment. We evaluate JailMeter on JailMeter-Eva, a challenging benchmark containing 330 human-labeled, non-rejected jailbreak instances. JailMeter achieves an accuracy of 97.27%, substantially outperforming existing evaluation methods. To support large-scale evaluation, we further distill JailMeter into a small language model, JailMeter\textsubscript{SLM}, which maintains comparable reliability with significantly reduced computational costs. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/Magi2B0y/JailMeter.
Expert evaluation of jailbreak responses is costly and difficult to scale, so the community increasingly relies on automated evaluators to determine whether an attack succeeds. However, jailbreak studies typically validate their chosen evaluator independently, repeatedly spending resources on similar evaluation efforts...
AlcaTRAz (Anchored Tree-Rule defense Against jailbreaks), a prompt-level defense based on rule trees that operates exclusively on the input text and requires no modification or retraining of the target model, is proposed.
J. Res, Petr Kaska, Martin Perešíni et al.· 0 citations
This work proposes Sequential Epistemic and Action-Level Validation (SEAV), a verification-centric jailbreak evaluation framework that decomposes responses into ordered steps and evaluates both validity and correctness, and shows that enforcing correctness substantially reshapes measured robustness.
Qilong Wu, Sahil Wadhwa, Pranab Mohanty et al.· 0 citations
This paper does an audit of defense mechanisms under jailbreak attacks on locally deployed models by tracing each failure back to the specific assumption it relies on.
This work proposes an explanation-aware safety framework that augments binary harmfulness detection with structured, human-interpretable explanations capturing severity, strategies, trigger spans, ratio-nales, and derived safety factors, and introduces a human–LLM hybrid annotation and canonicaliza-tion pipeline.
Sunghee Dong, Sungwon Yi, K. Bae et al.· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.