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Preprint Aug 2026

Bayesian Signaling and Entry Decisions under Uncertain Market Conditions

We develop a continuous-time entry-deterrence game in which market demand evolves according to the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation, allowing mean reversion and state-dependent volatility. An incumbent with privately known strength strategically chooses advertising and promotional...

M. Issah, Paramahansa Pramanik · 0 citations
Open access Sep 2026

A stochastic interaction between two firms

In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s belie...

M. Issah, Paramahansa Pramanik · 0 citations
Open access Sep 2026

A stochastic interaction between two firms

In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s belie...

M. Issah, Paramahansa Pramanik · 0 citations

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