Sep 2026· SN Business & Economics· Vol 6· 1 citation· 20 references
Abstract
In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s beliefs. On the other hand, the entrant, facing a costly and irreversible decision, delays entry until demand reaches a critical level, with outcomes depending on both the incumbent’s hidden type and uncertain demand. Under this dynamic Stackelberg environment by implementing a path integral control approach, we determine a Markovian Nash feedback equilibrium. We also performed an empirical study based on revenue data from Enterprise Products Partners and Targa Resources over the period 2010-2024, and the resulting empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the proposed model. The empirical trajectories exhibit qualitative patterns that are consistent with the mechanisms emphasized by the theoretical model, particularly with respect to persistence, recovery following adverse shocks, and differences in the responses of firms occupying distinct competitive positions.
We study a three-firm market following the breakdown of an initially complete cartel, taking both the breakdown and the identity of the departing firm as exogenously given. In the baseline model, the former cartel members no longer coordinate: all three firms choose quantities simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Thus...
Anton Badev, Vanya Ivanova, Diana Nedelcheva et al.· Foundations· 0 citations
Collusive agreements may break down completely or leave behind a surviving coalition of firms that continues to coordinate its production. We study an exogenously specified partial-cartel structure in which one firm operates independently while the remaining firms maximize their joint profit. We use the term failed car...
Anton Badev, Vanya Ivanova, Diana Nedelcheva et al.· Games· 0 citations
We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic exit game with asymmetric information. Each firm chooses the time to exit a duopoly and, conditional on remaining active, when to exit a monopoly. The asymmetry stems from privately observed exit values, while profit flows are driven by a general one-dimensional diffusion. A...
We provide a dynamic conjectural equilibrium model where, at each date, heterogeneous and uncertain individuals decide whether to contribute or not to a public good. The model frames the contribution problem within a novel perspective, keeping various classical public good issues together. The results show that a uni...
Giorgio Rampa, Margherita Saraceno· Journal of Public Economic T...· 0 citations