ABSTRACT Open science advocates aim to address epistemic injustice and global power asymmetries in research infrastructures yet underestimate structural vulnerabilities and risks embedded in data sharing practices. Drawing on an ethnographic study of the GCRF South–South Migration Inequality and Development Hub’s (MIDEQ), we argue that even well-intentioned systems, such as the MIDEQ hub, do not reach these vulnerabilities. To capture these overlooked harms, we employ the concept of epistemic disadvantage, a category coextensive with, but separate from epistemic injustice. Epistemic disadvantage includes ethically justified data withholding and misappropriation within consensual systems, which is not captured by existing notions of extractivism as those focus on the monetisation of epistemic resources without regard for the loss incurred by the originating community. To better account for these harms, we draw on two recent epistemic attitudes: the Book of Truths (BoT), which sees scientific truths as emerging through peer review, and the Book of Conversations (BoC), which values data for the interactions and reflections it provokes. Even when epistemic values recognise knowledge as relational and situated, extractivist harms persist. We offer an ameliorated concept of extractivism to include subtler, systemic harms rooted in epistemic disadvantage.
R. Alcalay, Joachim Vandekerckhove· Social Epistemology· 0 citations
This special issue examines the promises and limitations of Open Science (OS) and the conditions that produce inequity, injustice, and exclusion in research. Going well beyond the free sharing of publications typically referred to as Open Access, OS aspires to take advantage of new communication technologies to enhance access to and use of all the components of research, ranging from data to models, software, techniques, instruments, protocols and review procedures (Boulton and Royal Society 2012). OS advocates argue that the competitive and proprietary regimes and metrics under which research is currently conducted damage the reliability, quality, and social relevance of science. The main reason is that these regimes and metrics erode opportunities for critical scrutiny and collaboration which are the hallmarks of scientific work. They also disincentivise the exchange of insights and methods within and across disciplines (Radder 2010) leading to an inward-looking academic culture more interested in competing for the next high-impact publication than in developing reliable long-term solutions to societal and environmental challenges (Edwards and Roy 2017).
Sabina Leonelli, Paola Castaño, R. Alcalay· Social Epistemology· 0 citations
