Epistemic Disadvantage in Open Science Practices

Abstract

ABSTRACT Open science advocates aim to address epistemic injustice and global power asymmetries in research infrastructures yet underestimate structural vulnerabilities and risks embedded in data sharing practices. Drawing on an ethnographic study of the GCRF South–South Migration Inequality and Development Hub’s (MIDEQ), we argue that even well-intentioned systems, such as the MIDEQ hub, do not reach these vulnerabilities. To capture these overlooked harms, we employ the concept of epistemic disadvantage, a category coextensive with, but separate from epistemic injustice. Epistemic disadvantage includes ethically justified data withholding and misappropriation within consensual systems, which is not captured by existing notions of extractivism as those focus on the monetisation of epistemic resources without regard for the loss incurred by the originating community. To better account for these harms, we draw on two recent epistemic attitudes: the Book of Truths (BoT), which sees scientific truths as emerging through peer review, and the Book of Conversations (BoC), which values data for the interactions and reflections it provokes. Even when epistemic values recognise knowledge as relational and situated, extractivist harms persist. We offer an ameliorated concept of extractivism to include subtler, systemic harms rooted in epistemic disadvantage.