On-device deployment of large language models (LLMs) is increasingly adopted due to latency and privacy requirements, but exposes proprietary models to reverse engineering and intellectual property theft. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation for on-device inference, yet most TEE-bas...
Zhiyuan Wang, Yuezhi Zhou, Ziqi Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Matoi separates reusable consequence evidence from current execution authority and durable occurrence history. Its finite query-aware contract covers branches, ordered collections and negative lookups. A consumer reuses only its own checked evidence whose observations remain valid; signed requests, live grants, quota a...
Existing federated data condensation methods face privacy risks, as uploaded synthetic data may preserve sensitive information and remain vulnerable to reconstruction attacks. Moreover, their generation often incurs considerable client-side computational overhead, limiting deployment on resource-constrained devices. To...
Jing-Wei Zhao, Tian Sun, Yuan-Yuan Song et al.· 0 citations
Cybersecurity interviews uncover critical security experiences, behaviors, and privacy concerns often not fully captured by conventional technical assessments. Consequently, identifying genuine self-disclosures is challenging because statements are context-dependent, categories overlap, and automated interpretations ma...
Aisvarya Adeseye, Adeyemi Adeseye, Mohammad Tahir et al.· 0 citations
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LLM-agent evaluation reports behavioral scores but leaves the identity of the deployed runtime stack unreported. A tampered deployment that preserves evaluated outputs passes every output-only evaluator. We introduce DIB-Bench, a benchmark that measures this deployment-integrity blindness across 7,560 scored examples,...
Jian-Chang Su, Da-Wei Xiang, Yi-Fan Zhang et al.· 0 citations
AI agents now pause for approval before they send money, delete files or email outsiders, and that approval is usually treated as a second factor. We argue it is one only when compromising the agent cannot produce it and when it names exactly what it approves, and we test both conditions. We define twelve attacks on th...
Sai Varun Kodathala, Prashanth Pollishetty, J. Cargill· 2 citations
We present Screwtape, a pipeline that converts real agent transcripts into attacks that evade action-only monitors. An LLM attacker edits a transcript so that the agent causes a specified harm, such as leaking an API key or spawning an unmonitored agent. The edited actions are never executed, so we use an LLM verifier...
This work proposes a simple method to preserve datastore privacy in RAG systems via random projection, and suggests that random projection can serve as a competitive and practical baseline for privacy-preserving RAG systems.
AI agents take actions through tools. Some actions are sensitive, so guards that supervise them must themselves be evaluated reliably. Yet the data used to evaluate a guard can include cues that make labels predictable without measuring the intended safety construct, and those cues can also influence guard decisions. W...
Representation-based safety defenses for vision-language models (VLMs) often learn to separate harmful from benign inputs, but separation alone does not establish what a risk score means or when it should be trusted. We introduce Counterfactual Neighborhood Risk Fields (CNRF), an evidence-grounded framework for selecti...
Tianshi Wang, Jingsong Wang, Fengling Li et al.· 0 citations
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene. Existing defenses usually protect one boundary, either the planner/runtime or the point where external actio...
Research Manager Mike Walker reflects on a career spanning hacker culture, cybersecurity, and AI, sharing lessons about trust, teamwork, leadership, and why solving difficult problems requires curiosity, judgment, agility—and an understanding of the rules. The post Learn the rules: The hacker mindset appeared first on Microsoft Research.
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.
