Incident response planning is critical for restoring compromised software systems. Existing AIOps methods automate fault diagnosis and remediation and adapt response using feedback, but lack a unified decision basis across planning and execution. This limits their ability to maintain incident state and align actions wi...
Hanlin Jiang, Jionghao Huang, Shaofei Li et al.· 0 citations
Indirect prompt injection attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of LLMs: executing unauthorized tasks from untrusted sources. Despite the practical significance of this attack vector, existing benchmarks rely on small sets of template-based attacks (100-1,000 examples) that fail to capture the diversity and adaptivene...
Sahar Abdelnabi, Aideen Fay, Ahmed Salem et al.· 0 citations
Large language models are increasingly deployed in user-facing products that handle sensitive personal data while interacting with untrusted external content. This makes them a prime target for prompt injection attacks, in which an adversary injects malicious instructions in that content to hijack the model. Fine-tunin...
Xiaoxue Yang, Bozhidar Stevanoski, Matthieu Meeus et al.· 0 citations
As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, existing safety evaluations face a fundamental trade-off: manual benchmarks are costly, while LLM-based simulators are scalable but suffer from logic hallucination. We present AutoControl Arena, an automated framework for frontier AI risk evaluation built o...
Changyi Li, Pengfei Lu, Xudong Pan et al.· 0 citations
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Backdoor Attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) typically follow a trigger-response pattern, where satisfying a trigger condition activates a single terminal behavior. However, this single-point backdoor activation does not explore attacks in which malicious behavior develops gradually through multiple intermediate st...
Tahmid Imtiaz Imu, Emama Nahid, Prodipta Sen Amartya et al.· 0 citations
Multi-agent systems are increasingly used to solve coding tasks by coordinating agents that share code and plans. These agents are often optimized with reinforcement learning (RL) using automated evaluators, but bypassing evaluation can earn reward without producing a genuine solution. Prior work has largely treated re...
Yue-Peng Hu, P. Ghahremani, Reza Aghajani et al.· 0 citations
VEPA is introduced, a framework for the verified evolution of formal agent guardrails that represents the guardrail as a formal policy of executable symbolic rules over typed agent events and consistently outperforms baselines while expanding the scope of deterministic formal-policy enforcement.
Duy Nguyen, Lesly Miculicich, Bhavana Dalvi et al.· 0 citations
As LLM-powered scams proliferate, black-box forensics for conversational LLM agents offers a path to accountability for systems hidden behind anonymous endpoints. Identifying the base model behind a chatbot endpoint (attribution), without model parameter access or knowledge of the hidden system prompt, would let invest...
Isadora White, Yasaman Jafari, Taylor Berg-Kirkpatrick· 0 citations
An answer judge instructed to grade the final commitment should reject an explicitly wrong final value even when an earlier value matches the reference. We show that adding one colon to a candidate can violate this requirement depending on the presentation of the structured judging request. Numeric references certify t...
Federated learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model by aggregating local updates without sharing private data. In this work, we focus on cross-silo FL, where each client typically represents an independent organization. However, cross-silo FL can face the challenge of free-riders, c...
A membership-inference attack gets the output of a learning algorithm, and a target individual, and tries to determine whether this individual is a member of the training data or an independent sample from the same distribution. A successful membership-inference attack typically requires the attacker to have some knowl...
Mahdi Haghifam, Adam Smith, Jonathan Ullman· 0 citations
Unauthorized model distillation, in which a model is trained on the outputs of a proprietary large language model (LLM), is a growing threat to model providers. We study distillation inference: determining whether a suspect model was distilled from another model or trained independently. We formulate this problem as a...
Research Manager Mike Walker reflects on a career spanning hacker culture, cybersecurity, and AI, sharing lessons about trust, teamwork, leadership, and why solving difficult problems requires curiosity, judgment, agility—and an understanding of the rules. The post Learn the rules: The hacker mindset appeared first on Microsoft Research.
Critical flaws, compromised release channels and agentic AI threats landed within days of each other in mid-October 2026. Why “Black October” may say more about how well we now find weaknesses than about the attacks themselves. The post Black October? The Week AI Changed the Cybersecurity Conversation appeared first on GPT-Lab.