We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret in self-play, independent of the horizon $T$. With $n$ players and at most $m$ actions each, every player's individual swap regret is $O(\sqrt n\,m\log m\log^{5/2}(nm))$ at every finite horizon. The dynamics use the classical Blum-Mansour framework with optimism. Each player predicts the deviation gains, uses these predictions to update a row-stochastic transition matrix, and plays its stationary distribution. Our new ingredients include a tailored row normalization map and a two-scale higher-order predictor. An adversarially robust variant, obtained through a generic common-prefix switching wrapper, preserves the self-play bound up to a universal constant and guarantees individual swap regret at most $7\sqrt{mT\log m}$ in the adversarial setting.
This work proves that plain Optimistic Hedge with a constant step size can attain individual regret in general-sum games with n players and d=(d_1,\ldots,d_n) actions, under expected loss-vector feedback.
Optimistic Hedge with a constant step size can further achieve individual external regret under expected loss-vector feedback and proves factorial bounds on high-order differences of probability-weighted pairwise loss gaps, then applies finite-difference interpolation in a fixed Euclidean norm.
We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. For games with $d$ actions per player, we develop an algorithm achieving a duality gap of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{d/t})$ with high probability, simultaneously at every round $t...
This work introduces Multiplicatively Optimistic Regret Matching (MORM), an uncoupled learning rule for finite general-sum games that combines a potential-based regret-matching argument with multiplicative stability and Hellinger control of strategy movement.
Alternating online mirror descent (AltOMD) is a simple learning rule for zero-sum games, which improves upon simultaneous OMD numerically and theoretically. Previous work obtained $O(T^{1/3})$ and $O(T^{1/5})$ regret bounds for AltOMD, by leveraging modified-energy-function-based analyses. However, settling whether Alt...
Tian-Long Nan, C. Kroer· 0 citations
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