Skip to content
Preprint

What the Detector Can See: Evaluating CPS Anomaly Detectors Independently of the Decision Rule

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 36 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

Evaluating five CPS anomaly detector methods across three CPS benchmarks shows that detection failure can come from different sources: a weak representation, poor threshold calibration, or an attack with little physical effect.

Abstract

Anomaly detectors are often the last line of defense for cyber-physical systems (CPS). But detectors built in very different ways, from deep neural networks to invariant templates, are usually compared using precision, recall, or F1 at a single operating point. These scores mix two separate things: how well the detector represents the physical process, and how well its alarm threshold is set. We therefore treat a CPS anomaly detector as a two-stage pipeline: Stage 1 maps observations to residuals, and Stage 2 maps residuals to alarms. Instead of scoring only the final alarms, we evaluate Stage 1 directly using normalized residual energy, which has an exact connection to the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the trained-normal reference distribution. Because it does not depend on a specific alarm rule, it can separately measure attack separation, stability across the train-test gap, and the compactness with which a detector encodes the plant. Without any per-detector tuning, we apply this evaluation to five detectors -- GDN, FuSAGNet, TranAD, NSIBF, and GeCo -- across three CPS benchmarks: SWaT, WADI, and HAI. Although the detectors have similar ROC-AUC values on SWaT, their performance differs by more than an order of magnitude at a common false-alarm rate. Rankings also change across testbeds: TranAD ranks first on HAI but last on SWaT, while NSIBF ranks first on WADI but last on HAI. On WADI, localized attacks can evade detectors that pool evidence across all channels, helping explain why NSIBF outperforms methods that do well on other benchmarks. These results show that detection failure can come from different sources: a weak representation, poor threshold calibration, or an attack with little physical effect. A decision-rule-free analysis helps separate these causes.

View source

Similar papers

Preprint Jul 2026

Modeling Normal Is All You Need: Joint Latent Clustering for Anomaly Detection in Multimodal Cyber-Physical Systems

A cyber-physical system (CPS) can enter a faulty state that is individually normal on every sensor and reconstructs accurately, yet is improbable under normal joint operation. This exposes the central weakness of reconstruction-based detection: reconstruction measures whether a state can be reproduced (reachability), not whether normal operation is likely to occupy it (probability). We model CPS normal behavior as a union of many imbalanced operating regimes, ten assumptions we call Massive, Implicit, Imbalanced Multimodality (MIIM). Our detector, LatAD, jointly learns a latent and a Gaussian-mixture clustering of these regimes (VaDE) and scores anomalies by density rather than reconstruction. Because a CPS is an assembly of coupled subsystems, we factorize that density over correlation-community subsystems and combine per-community surprises by a cohesion-weighted, sparsity-adaptive statistic, concentrating a local fault a global density dilutes. Evaluated with raw point-wise metrics and a difficulty split isolating the stealthy faults a per-channel threshold misses, LatAD attains the best AUROC on three real CPS benchmarks (WADI 0.862, HAI 0.949, SWaT 0.993) and leads the difficult subset of all three, notably on HAI (0.849; a significant +0.09 over the next-best baseline, 95% CI [0.046, 0.160]); the reconstruction-based USAD and TranAD fall to 0.30-0.48 on these reconstructable-but-improbable faults.

Alexander Apartsin, Y. Aperstein · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

LLM as Detector: An In-context Learning Approach for Tabular Anomaly Detection

LLM-Detector is proposed, a framework that utilizes the in-context learning capacity of LLMs for structured, prompt-conditioned scoring synthesis, enabling LLMs to derive anomaly detection logic from structured normal-state knowledge.

Tu Nguyen, Dang Nguyen, T. Le et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Jul 2026

Cybersecurity Detection Classification with Reasoning-enabled Language Models

This work trains a chain-of-thought reasoning-enabled triage classifier on real, human-labeled Windows endpoint detections by combining automated prompt optimization, self-training, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards, and shows that a finetuned 30B model significantly outperforms frontier general-purpose models, motivating targeted training over scale.

Amol Khanna, Manu Nandan, Cristian Viorel Popa et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Autonomous Cyber Defense: Real-Time Attack Detection and Mitigation in Software-Defined Networks Using Machine Learning

Autonomous response has evolved into a timing-critical challenge rather than solely a matter of detection accuracy. In recent intrusions, the interval between initial access and the first lateral movement has been observed to be as short as 27 seconds, a window that precludes any human-in-the-loop workflow. This paper presents a closed-loop framework that detects and blocks attacks in software-defined networks without operator involvement, evaluating its performance against this stringent temporal constraint rather than relying exclusively on detection accuracy. An automated data pipeline collects IP flows and aggregates them into labeled training data, while a prevention module selects and trains candidate classifiers and issues blocking rules directly to the SDN controller. In a SYN flooding denial of service case study, the deployed K-Nearest Neighbors classifier achieved an F1 score of 96.7% and the cycle from flow availability to enforced block completed in 21 seconds, below the fastest breakout time reported to date.

A. Amaral, F. Moro, A. Malheiro · 0 citations

Anomaly Detection Based on Behavior Feature Correlation for IoT Systems

The approach models inter-device state correlations using a heterogeneous graph structure and partitions behavior patterns through iterative community detection and automated semantic annotation, and represents normal behavior by embedding and clustering of state sequences.

Yifan Lu, Qixiao Lin, Jian Mao et al. · 0 citations