Skip to content
Preprint

Revealed Rationality: Label-Free Evaluation and Regularization from Representation Theorems

Aug 2026 · 3 citations · 48 references
Economics Computer Science

TL;DR

It is argued that this ``if and only if'' structure provides a potentially useful foundation for label-free evaluation and regularization of LLMs and other AI systems.

Abstract

Representation theorems in decision theory establish that behavior satisfies certain axioms if and only if it can be rationalized by a well-defined objective. I argue that this ``if and only if''structure provides a potentially useful foundation for label-free evaluation and regularization of LLMs and other AI systems. Axiom compliance can be checked from the model's own responses to synthetic choice problems, with no external labels or human feedback, and the penalties are readily computable. Because the axioms are necessary and sufficient, the resulting checks exhaust the implications of the relevant rationality standard for the elicited data: a model that passes cannot be rejected on rationality grounds by any further test of the same data. I discuss three instantiations: probabilistic coherence via a theorem of de Finetti, preference rationality via Afriat's theorem, and subjective expected utility via a theorem of Echenique and Saito (2015), each yielding a continuous penalty that is zero whenever behavior can be rationalized. Since coherence does not restrict which objective rationalizes behavior, these penalties complement rather than replace other evaluation and training signals.

View source

Similar papers

Preprint Sep 2026

The Complexity of Justified Representation with Additive Utilities

We study the computational complexity of satisfying proportional representation -- in particular proportional, extended, and fully justified representation (PJR, EJR, and FJR) -- in participatory budgeting and committee elections with additive utilities. First, we give a complete picture of the complexity of the axioms...

Carmel Baharav, Jakob de Raaij, Agnes Totschnig · 2 citations · ⚡1
Open access Aug 2026

When Logical Correctness Is Not Rational Judgment: The Limits of Formal Reasoning in Algorithmic Decision Systems

The article concludes that formal validity and practical rationality answer to different criteria of success, that the empirical superiority of statistical prediction over human judgment does not collapse this distinction, and that the operative difference lies in the structure of failure rather than in its frequency.

Zhe Ji · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Utility-Level-Dependent Ambiguity

Experimental evidence suggests that ambiguity-sensitive choice can vary systematically with the circumstances of a decision. This paper isolates one channel within a stable preference relation: ambiguity weighting may depend on the act's certainty-equivalent level. After the standard Anscombe-Aumann calibration of cons...

Kemal Ozbek · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Axiomatizing Local Asymptotic Minimax Risk

Local asymptotic minimax (LAM) risk is a foundational efficiency criterion in statistics and econometrics. The literature uses two definitions of LAM risk: one which appears in classical lower bounds and another which appears in arguments establishing attainment of those bounds. Conventional efficiency arguments are co...

Ricky Li · 0 citations
#machine learning Preprint Sep 2026

A Unifying Perspective on Probabilities as Model Predictions

Although probabilistic statements are ubiquitous, foundational disagreements persist about their understanding, as exemplified by debates between Bayesians and frequentists; moreover, it is unclear when and why acting on them actually leads to desirable outcomes. Here, we argue that every probability is the output of a...

Benedikt Höltgen · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Full Justified Representation in Temporal Voting: Efficient Computation and Verification

In temporal voting, a fixed set of voters makes a collective decision in each of several rounds, and proportionality requires that groups with shared interests be represented across these decisions. Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest proportionality axioms known to be satisfiable in this setting...

Nicholas J. Teh · 2 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.