We study strategic trading around index reconstitution in a continuous-time, multiasset game with transient cross-asset price impact and heterogeneous beliefs about future index membership. Opportunistic traders position before a public announcement, adjust to the revealed composition, and trade around an indexer following a prescribed execution schedule. Under a no-price-manipulation condition, we construct a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium on every finite horizon. The affine feedback policies are computed from a non-standard matrix Riccati equation and linear ordinary differential equations whose number and dimensions do not grow with the number of traders. Aggregate inventories and price impact depend on beliefs only through the population-average belief, while differences in beliefs affect individual inventory positions. Under mean-field scaling, we construct a mean-field equilibrium and obtain quantitative convergence and approximate-Nash bounds. Numerical illustrations show how competition and impact decay determine the balance between adverse price displacement from anticipatory trading and savings in the indexer's execution costs when opportunists trade against its orders during implementation.
Simulation studies of algorithmic collusion often summarise results through average prices and profts. Such summaries conceal the variety and distribution of distinct prices, cycles, and collusive regimes. This limitation is salient given that game theory predicts multiple equilibria, implying a distribution rather tha...
Krzysztof Siegieda· Przegląd Statystyczny. Stati...· 0 citations
Although market participants generally have access to a common information set, they make decisions based on forecasts formed over heterogeneous horizons. Because market impact depends on aggregate positions rather than trader identities, these decisions feed back into prices through their collective effect. We introdu...
We study finite-horizon portfolio optimization with proportional transaction costs and trading opportunities arriving at the jump times of a Cox process. Borrowing and short-selling are prohibited, while utility functions need not be concave, increasing, or differentiable. The admissible class includes differentiable u...
We study a Kyle--Back model in which the informed trader has dynamic mean--variance preferences, leading to a time-inconsistent trading problem that is formulated as an intrapersonal game. The model combines two equilibrium requirements: a trading--pricing equilibrium between the informed trader and the market maker, a...
This paper develops a stylized continuous-time framework for open-end fund investment in which state-dependent fund flows, passive benchmarking, and strategic manager–investor interaction are modeled jointly. The contribution is not a new Stackelberg solution concept; rather, it is the economic mechanism created by com...
Yin Li, Ya-Zhi Song, Can Zhou et al.· Mathematics· 0 citations
Observed choice in a dynamic game mixes current profit with continuation value. A rival adds a second problem: the same comparison averages over the rival's equilibrium policy. Changing the primitive transition rewrites continuation technology; changing the rival's Markov policy, holding that law fixed, rewrites the mi...
Hao-Jie Liu, Zi-Han Lin· 0 citations
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