Although market participants generally have access to a common information set, they make decisions based on forecasts formed over heterogeneous horizons. Because market impact depends on aggregate positions rather than trader identities, these decisions feed back into prices through their collective effect. We introduce a linear mean-field model of this interaction. The observed price is decomposed into a martingale component, a common predictable signal represented by a Volterra process, and the market impact generated by aggregate positions. Agents take positions according to conditional forecasts of future signal increments and a fraction of anticipated aggregate impact over their respective horizons. Within a Gaussian-Volterra framework, we characterize equilibrium through a linear fixed-point equation for aggregate positions and establish existence and uniqueness under explicit conditions. At equilibrium, we identify a balance condition that cancels the direct transmission of the common signal to the observed price. We then study the limit in which agents fully account for market impact. Along a suitably scaled family of equilibria satisfying explicit conditions, the contributions of the predictable signal and the market impact cancel in the limit, and the observed price converges to its martingale component. For fractional-type signals and Gamma-distributed horizons, we further derive local H\"older bounds and identify the horizon distributions for which the observed price has local regularity compatible with that of Brownian motion.
Asset-pricing models typically condition on a fixed information set. This paper endogenises the market's conditioning architecture by allowing portfolios to choose representations whose induced exposures affect prices. Capital allocated across representations determines aggregate positions and the clearing premium, whi...
We study strategic trading around index reconstitution in a continuous-time, multiasset game with transient cross-asset price impact and heterogeneous beliefs about future index membership. Opportunistic traders position before a public announcement, adjust to the revealed composition, and trade around an indexer follo...
Lukas-Benedikt Fiechtner, José H. Blanchet· 0 citations
We develop a continuous-time entry-deterrence game in which market demand evolves according to the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation, allowing mean reversion and state-dependent volatility. An incumbent with privately known strength strategically chooses advertising and promotional...
In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s belie...
M. Issah, Paramahansa Pramanik· SN Business & Economics· 1 citation
This paper studies the algorithmic design of price competition in oligopolistic markets, with a focus on long-run market dynamics under reference price effects. We consider a sequential price competition framework with multiple sellers operating over a finite horizon, each lacking prior knowledge of the demand functi...
Yong-Ge Yang, Jian-Nan Ke, Cong Shi· Production and operations ma...· 0 citations
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