THE PHENOMENON OF STRUCTURAL PARASITISM IN THE RUSSIAN BANKING SECTOR

Abstract

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of structural imbalances in the Russian banking sector, classified within the framework of institutional economics as forms of rent-seeking behavior and structural parasitism. Using data from the Bank of Russia, Rosstat, and the Ministry of Economic Development for the period 2023–2026, the mechanisms underlying the formation of record profits at credit institutions amid macroeconomic turbulence and stagnation in the real sector are examined. Particular attention is paid to the asymmetry of key rate transmission, the role of the state as an institutional protector of systemically important banks, and income distribution imbalances. A comparative study is conducted with the banking systems of developing countries (Brazil, India), countries with dominant state capital (China), and developed markets (the EU, the US). It is shown that the central element of the phenomenon of superprofitability in the Russian banking sector is the extraordinary expansion of net interest margins. The second most important pillar of Russian banks' record profitability is fees and other non-interest income. Record profitability for Russian banks in the period 2023–2026 would have been impossible without a favorable institutional environment, in which the state acts not as a neutral regulator, but as a direct and indirect institutional protector of the interests of large, predominantly state-owned banking capital. It has been determined that the rent-seeking behavior of the banking sector, supported by a unique institutional framework, has profound and destructive consequences for the entire economy, leading to a paradoxical situation where record profits in the financial system are accompanied by stagnation and degradation of the real sector. A set of measures is proposed to neutralize these negative effects and reorient the banking sector toward real economic growth.