Results show that apparent attack winners depend on text-quality constraints, attack generality, and capability assumptions, and that apparent attack winners depend on text-quality constraints, attack generality, and capability assumptions.
Abstract
LLM watermarking helps trace the origin of generated text, but faces stealing attacks that recover watermark information, scrubbing attacks that remove watermark signals, and spoofing attacks that forge text accepted as watermarked. These attacks are often studied in isolation, leaving their connections unclear. Evaluations also often lack shared detector calibration, metric definitions, and reporting protocols. Moreover, measuring attack success and text quality separately makes it difficult to identify attacks that are both effective and quality-preserving. We propose MarkSec, a general framework that unifies analyses of stealing, scrubbing, and spoofing. We evaluate attacks under a common reporting protocol and introduce a quality-constrained attack success metric to assess effectiveness and text quality jointly. Experiments across representative watermark families, attacks, LLMs, and datasets reveal three findings. First, attacks that appear strongest by watermark removal alone can fall behind general rewriting when success also requires acceptable text quality. Second, general rewriting remains a strong baseline across watermark families, while its advantage over other scrubbers varies by family. Third, in a case study of one watermark family, stealing-based scrubbers often underperform the best general-scrubbing baselines when text quality is required. These results show that apparent attack winners depend on text-quality constraints, attack generality, and capability assumptions.
Results show that the copy–paste attack degrades watermark detectability when using very sparingly and only short sentences are used, while deletion becomes effective only at extreme levels on short texts, and underscore the need for future watermark designs to prioritise resilience to semantic and cross-lingual transf...
Jakob Elias Albrecht, A. Jakoby, Benno Maria et al.· 0 citations
This work introduces RemTraceNet, which fuses constrained residuals, local relations, FFT/Haar statistics, and block-DCT evidence at native resolution and outperforms retrained SRNet, ZhuNet, and SiaStegNet baselines by 10.80--15.68 percentage points.
Audio watermarking protects digital speech by embedding imperceptible signals for ownership verification and misuse tracing. However, the security of learning-based watermarking remains insufficiently understood under realistic adversarial removal, where attackers cannot access or query the watermark encoder, decoder,...
FeatMark is introduced, a watermarking framework that shifts from pixel-level, energy-starved perturbations to inconspicuous semantic features: small, scene-consistent micro- features that remain natural to humans while providing a stronger, machine-verifiable provenance signal.
Hao-Yang Li, Ruo-Xi Sun, Qing-Qing Ye et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
This work identifies two complementary laundering regimes: OpenAI models produce the strongest payload disruption across the evaluated schemes, whereas Nano Banana 2 shows that DwtDct remains vulnerable under high-fidelity reconstruction.
Neural audio watermarks are increasingly used to attribute and detect AI-generated speech, so their practical value rests on how cheaply an adversary can remove them. Robustness is usually measured by running a fixed battery of distortions blindly against every scheme. We instead make removal diagnostic: from a few cle...
Likhith Kumara· 0 citations
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