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RemTraceNet: Few-Shot Forensic Detection of Invisible Watermark Attacks

Sep 2026 · 0 citations · 28 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work introduces RemTraceNet, which fuses constrained residuals, local relations, FFT/Haar statistics, and block-DCT evidence at native resolution and outperforms retrained SRNet, ZhuNet, and SiaStegNet baselines by 10.80--15.68 percentage points.

Abstract

Removing an invisible watermark and concealing the forensic evidence are distinct objectives: successfully disrupting the embedded watermark does not imply that the removal process is forensically undetectable. When verification fails, removal traces can provide complementary evidence for provenance and ownership verification, whereas their absence leaves the cause of the failure ambiguous. Existing methods are typically evaluated by watermark suppression and perceptual quality, while forensic stealth is rarely considered. We therefore study watermark-attack-specific few-shot forensics: for each known pipeline, a specialist can separate its outputs from paired clean and unattacked watermarked controls. Separate Attack-vs-Clean and Attack-vs-Watermarked evaluations prevent watermark-presence shortcuts. Image-aligned and prompt-matched controls are used for post-hoc and generator-integrated schemes, respectively. In this work, we introduce RemTraceNet, which fuses constrained residuals, local relations, FFT/Haar statistics, and block-DCT evidence at native resolution. Across 23 removal pipelines and 10 watermark configurations, we evaluate native 256 x 256 and 512 x 512 inputs. With 100 attacked training images per pipeline, the three-seed TPR@1%FPR, macro-averaged over attacks and watermark configurations, ranges from 82.75% to 88.17% across resolutions and control types. Under the condition of same labels and protocol, RemTraceNet outperforms retrained SRNet, ZhuNet, and SiaStegNet baselines by 10.80--15.68 percentage points. Extensive experimental results show that erasing a watermark and erasing evidence of its removal are distinct challenges, and that removal traces remain learnable under limited supervision.

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