This work evaluates the Sola Security Brain, a security intelligence layer whose relational substrate is resolved offline and whose security logic is evaluated against it at query time, against two coding agents operating the same live AWS environment through a read-only CLI, Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, over 28 investigation tasks.
Abstract
Cloud-security investigation is dominated by population tasks: which identities can read a data store, how many resources fail a control, what is reachable from another account. These resolve against a complete inventory, not a named object, so a partial answer to one is not a partial result but a different one. Coding agents can now be given read-only cloud credentials and asked to investigate directly, which raises the question of what a purpose-built security context layer still contributes. We evaluate the Sola Security Brain, a security intelligence layer whose relational substrate is resolved offline and whose security logic is evaluated against it at query time, against two coding agents operating the same live AWS environment through a read-only CLI, Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, over 28 investigation tasks. All three are scored by a blinded, tier-weighted, grounding-gated relative recall over one joint claim pool, so the scores share a denominator. The Sola Security Brain reaches 0.549 +/- 0.012 coverage against 0.340 +/- 0.011 for Claude Code and 0.281 +/- 0.006 for Codex, with the ordering identical in every grading draw. It leads 24 of 28 tasks from the cheapest model tier, at 17.8x and 20.8x lower cost per task than Claude Code and Codex. Beyond the aggregate, we describe an answer-level pattern we term sample-and-generalise: both agents enumerate a fraction of a large population, assert an unhedged universal negative, and disclose the sample size only in answer metadata rather than in the answer. In one task Claude Code reported that no bucket policies exist after checking four bucket families, in a sweep that sampled 40 of roughly 5,000 buckets, in an account where 65 buckets carry a wildcard-principal read grant.
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