REENCHANTMENT, INEFFABILITY, AND “THE DIALECTIC OF NOMINALISM”

Husserl and Twardowski: Two Paths for the Reform of Logic

This paper reconstructs, in a historical and critical perspective, the Brentanian project of a reform of logic and the bifurcation that emerges between Twardowski and Husserl. Against the widespread tendency to frame the Austro-Polish debates through the metaphysical opposition realism/idealism, it argues that the decisive issue concerns the constitution and scope of a formally sound yet epistemologically relevant logic. Building on Brentano's reduction of judgment to existential acceptance or rejection, the paper highlights how "modification" becomes the operator through which predicative judgments are transformed into existential form. It then examines Twardowski's theory of logical modification—grounded in the distinction between attributive and modifying adjectives and in the thesis that representation does not posit existence—and shows how this framework motivates his account of intentional (in-)existence and his stance on general objects. Husserl's critique, by contrast, relocates modification within a phenomenological theory of meaning and intentionality: nominalization, suppositio materialis, and especially neutralization articulate a layered system of logical and intentional modifications. The paper concludes that Husserl's reform opens a systematic place for modalizations (possibility, necessity, probability) as constitutive features of meaning and noematic content.

Two truths and one aporia: a Madhyamaka model of agency in dialogue with Western philosophy of action

and Plato

Christian Metaphysics and Human Identity

Since early modernity, thinkers have rejected much of the Christian metaphysical inheritance. Aristotelian substance, for example, was judged to be an empty concept serving little purpose; Locke believed it was empty and unknowable, that which “we know not what, … which we take to be the substratum , or support, of those Ideas we do know.” This rejection was summarized and finalized by Heidegger's sweeping dismissal of metaphysical subjectivity, and post‐modern philosophers unpacked the implications in their proposals of a passive and fractured non‐subject. Yet the substitutes given by modern and postmodern thinkers replace being with doing, in which human beings are marked by consciousness (Locke), autonomous self‐legislating (Kant), or authenticity (Rousseau, and a racially‐coded version with Heidegger). Yet many of these thinkers also wish to retain distinctively Christian and humanistic convictions, such as dignity and political agency. I will argue that the Christian ontology of the person that was developed in the service of Trinitarian theology and Christology is necessary to safeguard an authentic humanism and personal identity.

Quatro considerações sobre fazer Realismo filosófico

The purpose of this article is to develop four considerations that will allow us to approach philosophical Realism from a complex point of view. It begins by 1) seeking an operational definition of Realism, contrasting it with unrealist, anti-realist, idealist, and materialist positions, with the aim of considering critiques from these positions in order to reject or appropriate some of their guidelines into our own position. Next, we move into 2) a consideration of the term "Complexity," contrasting it with literalist assertions, differentiating between reality and givenness, and providing some considerations into categorical intuition. Then, 3) we explore the connection between Complex Realism and two forms of pluralism (material and formal/categorical) through the principle of irreductions and the conception of the subdisciplines of Ontography and Categorical Analysis. This leads to the notion of pluralism(s) as the milieu and/or dhamma of Complex Realism. Finally, 4) through the notion of interobjectivity, the category of Ontological Work is explored as the ontological factory floor that operates by creating ontognoseological conditions for the production of knowledge, theory, practice, and pragmatism.

Schelling between German Idealism and Historicism: Rethinking Historical Consciousness

The aim of this paper is to reassess Schelling’s role in the emergence of nineteenth-century German historicism. In some of the most comprehensive reconstructions of the origins of German historicism and hermeneutics, Schelling’s figure is accorded virtually no prominence. Against this tendency, the paper argues that Schelling should be understood not merely as a precursor of historicism, but as a decisive mediator between German Idealism and the historicist tradition. Taking its point of departure from the influential readings of Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst Troeltsch, the paper seeks to situate Schelling’s contribution to the historicist tradition by analyzing three fundamental ideas that guide his approach to history: (1) an artistic conception of historiography, (2) hermeneutic consciousness, and (3) a critique of the idea of progress. In doing so, it shows that Schelling draws close to the central concerns of the classical representatives of the historicist tradition—above all Herder, Humboldt, and Ranke—while never abandoning the fundamental framework of German Idealism.