From a philosophical perspective, this book considers whether artificial intelligence (AI) undermines human autonomy. Are we becoming increasingly controlled by external forces when AI makes decisions for us? Characteristics such as artificial autonomy, opacity and extreme speed could mark a tipping point at which self-determination gives way to external control. Responsibility becomes questionable when decisions are not transparent and human control is lost. At the same time, autonomous AI systems make it difficult to assess the truth and reliability of information. Ultimately, the book views AI as a form of 'smart power' that subtly—and often almost imperceptibly—influences our thinking, judgement and actions.
The doctoral thesis examines issues at the interface between technology and law and highlights the use of artificial intelligence in legislative work. The focus is thus on an area of application that has so far only been considered marginally in scientific discussion, even though it is already technically feasible and at the same time highly relevant for the future. The core of the study is the question of the extent to which the legislative use of AI is compatible with the unalterable core of the constitution. To this end, necessary legislative changes are identified and specific duties of care are derived, based on the requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
The rapid integration of artificial intelligence into everyday life has intensified a long-standing feature of human cognition: the attribution of agency, intention, and understanding to nonhuman systems. People describe language models, virtual assistants, and autonomous technologies as if these systems know, decide, want, or understand, and they continue to do so even when they know the systems have no inner life. The standard account dismisses this as naïve anthropomorphism, the misfiring of evolved agency-detection systems calibrated in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. We argue that the standard account is incomplete. It explains the immediacy of anthropomorphic response but not its persistence even when users know the system has no mind. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, philosophy of agency, and the active inference framework, we advance the Embodied Hijack hypothesis. Across evolutionary time, fluent communication and contingent responsiveness were produced only by embodied, self-maintaining agents with vulnerability and temporal continuity. Current conversational LLM deployments are the first class of entity to reproduce these signals without the grounding properties — biological self-maintenance, vulnerability, and temporal continuity — that historically produced them. The result is a predictable misalignment: users’ inferential systems treat these signals as evidence of agency they were calibrated to indicate, producing systematic misattribution. The Embodied Hijack is not irrationality. It is the optimal predictive response of a Pleistocene-calibrated brain to the rupture of the evolutionary invariant that once tied fluent communication to embodied self-maintenance. The framework yields a unique empirical signature: anthropomorphic response will track the signal profile of a system independently of users’ propositional beliefs about what the system is. We close by arguing that the goal is epistemic alignment — bringing how users interpret these systems into correspondence with what these systems actually are — and that this alignment is achieved through interface design rather than user education.
Sheila L. Macrine· Frontiers in Psychology· 0 citations
It is suggested that if the view is right, a certain type of moral risk can be averted since researchers are unlikely to stumble into accidentally creating AI models that are conscious, and a new form of AI risk that arises from the view.
Justin Tiehen, A. Tubert· Journal of Consciousness Stu...· 0 citations
This paper explores the impact of Artificial Intelligence (ai) and its various socio-technological tools on the quality of political deliberation. It particularly analyzes the deliberative processes that occur within institutional frameworks under principles of political representation. The proposed hypothesis is that AI, under certain conditions, has the potential to actively participate in deliberative processes within democratic frameworks, improving the quality of public debate, broadening inclusion, and strengthening collective rationality. To this end, two interrelated analyses are proposed, one theoretical and the other methodological: 1) the ideal conditions that any ai intervening in public deliberative processes must incorporate to preserve its democratic legitimacy; and 2) the design of a matrix that allows for verifying these conditions in specific cases.
According to the legal-grammatical picture of constitutivism, the constitutive standards of a kind x carry an existential threat: abiding by them is necessary for being an x at all. But this seems to leave no room for defective x’s—the bad-x problem. A functional model escapes this problem, yet it fits structural rational agency poorly. I argue that a suitably complex legal-grammatical model—one attentive to how legal enterprises are materially realized—makes room for genuinely internal violations: intelligible fouls, correctable from a dynamic kernel of perfect compliance. The existential threat survives, yet genuine defect finds a place within it.
Luca Ferrero· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
