Jul 2026· Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy· 0 citations· 17 references
Abstract
Recent years have seen the resurgence of the inferentialist approach to metasemantics (Chalmers, 2021a; Peregrin, 2014, 2024). However, there remain worries as to whether inferentialism can give us an account of language that would be ‘in good standing’. One worry concerns the risk of a kind of conceptual parochialism: inferential rules seem to float free of the fundamental structure of the world. This would make natural language unsuitable for serious metaphysical inquiry. My aim in this paper is to show that this worry can be resolved by the inferentialist. In particular, I show that normative inferentialism predicts a version of reference magnetism, namely ‘co-magnetism’ (Williams, 2020).
Descartes'
cogito
argument is perhaps the most well‐known philosophical argument, the conclusion of which is supposed to be a form of rationalism that allows for contingent
a priori
knowledge of the world. In this short note, I argue that, in fact, the all important statement, ‘I am, I exist’, should be analysed through the lens of (classical) two‐dimensional semantics (a la Kaplan and Evans). Once we do this, I argue, we find that even though the thought is always true when thought, it does not express a deep contingency (as per Evans). That is, it does not result in substantive knowledge of the world. I note that it might also not be superficially contingent, but something more nuanced in between due to the performative nature of the thought.
In
On Memory and Recollection
, Aristotle makes the curious remark that recollection is ‘a sort of reasoning’ (
sullogismos tis
) (453a10). The remark is especially puzzling in light of the automatic and associative character of what he takes to be typical recollective processes, since these features can create the impression that recollection is due merely to a triggering mechanism. This paper proposes a reading that resolves this apparent tension. On the proposed reading, the remark points to a basic form of rationality that familiar pictures of reasoning simply presuppose.
In this paper, we translate and interpret the passage from Nicomachean Ethics 7.1146a21-32, in which Aristotle presents a sophistical paradox when discussing the difficulties surrounding the theme of akrasia. We base our analysis on the description of paradoxes in On Sophistical Refutations and on the explanation of the functioning of the practical syllogism in Movement Animals. Finally, we present the argument put forward in the paradox, which equates an akratic fool with a sage, and we maintain that this sophistical reasoning is superficial, though it functions as an element that stimulates philosophical investigation
It is suggested that if the view is right, a certain type of moral risk can be averted since researchers are unlikely to stumble into accidentally creating AI models that are conscious, and a new form of AI risk that arises from the view.
Justin Tiehen, A. Tubert· Journal of Consciousness Stu...· 0 citations
Machine learning has reinvigorated longstanding ambitions to develop a predictive science of society. This essay argues that enthusiasm for ML as a turning point rests on a category confusion between two distinct scientific imaginaries: Laplace’s deterministic universe, in which sufficient data and computational power yield precise prediction, and Comte’s social physics, which sought descriptive regularities rather than causal mechanisms. ML’s insertion within the dominant causal frameworks that characterize much quantitative social science implies, in particular, that the Comtian promise is far from reality on the ground. The essay explores three reasons why ML is unlikely to deliver a fundamental epistemic break: the performative instability of social classifications, the irreducible indexicality of data and claims, and the irreducibility of collective knowledge to information underdetermine ML’s overall capacity.