Aug 2026· Scientia et Fides· 0 citations· 27 references
TL;DR
The concept of “alienated intelligence” is introduced to critically examine contemporary cultural perceptions of artificial intelligence to argue that certain visions of AI function as cultural projections of human cognitive capacities that become externalized, idealized, and reified in technological systems.
Abstract
This article introduces the concept of “alienated intelligence” to critically examine contemporary cultural perceptions of artificial intelligence (AI). Drawing on Ludwig Feuerbach’s theory of projection and alienation, it argues that certain visions of AI function as cultural projections of human cognitive capacities that become externalized, idealized, and reified in technological systems. The analysis situates this claim within a broader philosophical framework, engaging Socrates’ notion of wisdom as awareness of ignorance, Dilthey’s account of embodied and integrated cognition, and Damasio’s critique of the Cartesian separation of reason and emotion. Against reductive computational models of mind, the article emphasizes that human cognition is not merely calculative but structurally unified, affective, and contextually embedded. It further argues that the outsourcing of cognitive activities to AI risks not only diminishing retained knowledge but also narrowing our awareness of what we do not know. Finally, the article examines the anthropomorphization and mystification of algorithmic systems as expressions of a broader cultural tendency to mythologize opaque technologies.
It is argued that anthropology requires a new conceptual framework for understanding the contemporary social life of artificial intelligence (AI), and "the magic of AI" is proposed as an analytical concept that shifts attention from AI's technical capacities to the beliefs, uncertainties, and sociotechnical imaginaries through which it acquires authority and efficacy.
M. Baas, Roanne van Voorst· Anthropological Theory· 2 citations
The rise of artificial intelligence has revived a fundamentally Cartesian question: what conditions must hold for something to count as genuinely thinking? This paper examines the relationship between cognitive delegation and the Cartesian cogito, arguing that contemporary AI systems challenge not the logical validity of the cogito itself, but its cultural and epistemic centrality. Drawing on a methodological distinction between functional, Cartesian, and agential forms of thinking, the paper develops what is termed the "Cartesian paradox": while humans increasingly delegate judgment and reasoning to AI without necessarily ceasing to exist, machines increasingly reproduce the external markers of intelligence without thereby becoming res cogitantes. The analysis shows that the cogito guarantees certainty of existence through first-person self-presence, but does not imply that the suspension of reflective thought entails ontological annihilation. At the same time, the paper argues that AI systems, despite their growing functional sophistication, remain forms of res extensa insofar as they lack subjective self-awareness and agential self-relation. The conclusion is that the real danger posed by AI is not the replacement of human beings by conscious machines, but the progressive reduction of thinking to operational performance, externalized computation, and algorithmic delegation.
Giuseppe Pernagallo· International Conference on...· 0 citations
The very notion of consciousness has begun to transform from an abstract computation tool, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has morphed into a defining transformative agent that is remodelling the cognitive framework in which identity and decision-making occur at all human levels. Approaching both from the methodologically less selective angle of a Philosophical Psychology that attends separately to certain aspects and then weaves them into a fused together understanding, this study raises questions on how current AI-related advances influence our insights into consciousness, selfhood, agency, intentionality and cognition.
Employing a qualitative conceptual research design based on philosophical inquiry together with a systematic interdisciplinary literature search (2015-2025 within Scopus, Web of Science, PsycINFO, JSTOR, IEEE Xplore and PhilPapers), evidence from cognitive science, neuroscience and AI ethics was synthesised. The analysis revealed six significant emergent themes:
• AI as cognitive augmentation and "second brain"
• There is re-definition of consciousness and phenomenological experience
• Selfhood and Privacy: Changing identities
• Re-evaluations of human agency and moral accountability
• Psychological effects of prolonged human - machine dialogue; and
• The importance of a harmonised philosophical-psychological paradigm
The results suggest that, although modern AI does not yet possess the subjective consciousness experience of humans, it is radically altering how people think, remember, decide and construct identity. AI operates more as a cognitive partner, which leads to urgent ethical questions of autonomy, authenticity and accountability. We find that AI is no lointelligenceew technology but active overwriting of the cognitive and psychocultural context in which people encounter new data modalities through new "intelligences". Key implications include the urgent requirement for adaptive curricula, ethically sound policy-making and anticipatory psychological practices to maintain human agency and critical thinking in the longer term.
G. R. N. Gunarathne· International Journal of Lat...· 0 citations
The article demonstrates how attempts to decentre the human often reconstitute new forms of authority in attempts to decentre the human and examines the possibility of surpassing standard anthropocentric approaches in AI while maintaining a critical philosophical engagement with the structurally necessary yet precarious character of organizing principles.
Marshall McLuhan’s work on media and technology remains highly relevant to contemporary discussions of artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on human consciousness. This article examines McLuhan’s conception of media as extensions of human faculties and explores his contention that media technologies reshape not only patterns of communication but also modes of perception, cognition, and consciousness itself. Drawing upon McLuhan’s seminal insights, the article argues that media and technology are functionally interchangeable concepts insofar as both serve as environmental forces that alter the structure of human awareness and social interaction. The analysis applies McLuhan’s theoretical framework to the emergence of AI as a transformative medium. Rather than viewing AI merely as a tool, the article considers it a new communicative environment capable of influencing how individuals acquire knowledge, process information, make decisions, and construct meaning. Particular attention is given to Generation Beta and subsequent generations, whose cognitive and social development will occur within increasingly AI-mediated environments. From this perspective, AI may exert a predominantly salubrious influence by expanding access to information, enhancing learning opportunities, augmenting creativity, and facilitating new forms of intellectual engagement. At the same time, the article concludes with a caution rooted in McLuhan’s broader media theory: regardless of the specific direction AI ultimately takes society, media environments work human beings over completely. They shape not only what individuals think but also how they think, perceive, and interact with the world. As a result, artificial intelligence should be understood not simply as a technological innovation but as a powerful medium with the capacity to physically, psychologically, and socially mold consciousness and, in doing so, transform the future trajectory of human society.
Harvey W. Kushner· American Behavioral Scientis...· 0 citations
It is argued that intelligence should be assessed not by output quality or efficiency alone, but by its impact on intellectual character, arguing that intelligence should be assessed not by output quality or efficiency alone, but by its impact on intellectual character.