Direct reciprocity, a mechanism for evolution of cooperation, rests on a promise of the future: that the cost of cooperation will be returned in subsequent encounters. Whether reciprocity works is often asked as a question about evolutionary stability: can a population of cooperators resist invasion by mutants that defect? Here we answer this question exhaustively for a large, but finite strategy space projected onto an uncountable infinity of evolutionary games. We take the binary memory-two strategies, in which each of the sixteen possible two-round histories is answered by cooperation or defection up to a small error rate. We work out what every one of them achieves on its own and against every rival, in every symmetric two-player game. Alone, they realise 475 distinct patterns of play carrying 229 distinct cooperation rates. Against each other, a game supports between 299 and 22069 Nash equilibria, that is, resident strategies that no rare mutant can outperform. Efficient strategies, which are those that reach maximum payoff, are present as equilibria at every game, and for 3/8 of games efficient strategies constitute the only equilibria. Those results belong to the limit of a vanishingly small error rate. For any positive error rate the map changes: under 1/4 of all games support no equilibrium, over 3/8 support equilibria but none are efficient, over 1/8 support equilibria and all are efficient, and under 1/4 of games support equilibria of both kinds. Every share quoted here is an exact natural density over the plane of games. The map is the landscape over which any evolutionary dynamics in this strategy space moves.
In evolutionary game dynamics, strategies undergo mutation and natural selection. Owing to practical limitations, many studies simulate evolution in a restricted strategy space. This is especially true for repeated games, where long-run strategies can be arbitrarily complex. It can be challenging to find a suitable s...
Philip LaPorte, Pranav Velavan· Proceedings of the Royal Soc...· 0 citations
Autopoietic Game Theory is introduced, a computational model where social interactions, replication mechanisms, and their associated computational costs are endogenous and simultaneously co-evolving and can incorporate exogenous pressures.
Kunal Jha, F. Cicala, B. A. Y. Arcas et al.· 0 citations
Learning agents, whether humans or algorithms, adapt to one another rather than to a fixed environment. Selfish learning need not produce a good outcome for the group, especially when learners face a social dilemma. The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is the classical example, but it is usually studied in populations...
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is often studied in terms of strategy performance and long-run cooperation. This paper offers an alternative perspective: given a finite set of strategies, the long-run interaction between strategies is interpreted as an induced symmetric 2 × 2 game, and the distribution of such induced...
We study learning in continuous games when players receive only pairwise preference feedback, revealing which of two actions is preferred but neither payoff values nor preference magnitudes. We first show that standard external regret and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are not identifiable from this ordinal informa...
Mechanistic analyses show that a moderate neighborhood size enables individuals to strike an optimal balance between information sufficiency and decision-making tractability, which allows them to detect reciprocal opportunities while avoiding the deterioration of decision quality due to information overload.
Yi-Hsin Ku, Xin Ou, Ji-Qiang Zhang et al.· 0 citations
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