Aug 2026· Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences· Vol 293, pp. 21-26· 0 citations
Abstract
This study models a sequential game among a government, a focal firm, and a supplier that may underinvest in compliant emission reduction. It compares a direct subsidy to the supplier with an indirect subsidy to the focal firm for supplier support. Direct subsidies correct supplier underinvestment; focal firms also support suppliers when demand is positive, but choose less support than is socially optimal. The choice of subsidy recipient depends on the focal firm's support cost. When the support cost is low, the indirect subsidy dominates in both compliance level and social welfare. When the support cost is high, the direct subsidy dominates in both dimensions. At an intermediate support cost, the direct subsidy generates a higher compliance level, whereas the indirect subsidy yields greater social welfare. Therefore, the government should select the subsidy recipient according to its policy objective and the focal firm's actual support efficiency.
This paper investigates how the government selects demand-side promotional subsidy strategies in a market where a green supply chain competes with a conventional supply chain and the green manufacturer is risk-averse. It focuses on analyzing the government's choice among no-subsidy, price-subsidy and the green-subs...
Junhua Liu, You-Xian Zhang, Xiao-Fang Chen et al.· Modern Supply Chain Research...· 0 citations
To address the increasing volume of end-of-life power batteries, governments leverage Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations to encourage battery suppliers to increase recycling. We develop a Stackelberg game model for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) that includes a government, a battery supplier, an NEV...
As the global stockpile of end-of-life electric vehicle batteries grows, subsidies have become a primary policy tool to stimulate recycling. However, recyclers can exploit private information about a battery’s State of Health to inflate quality claims and obtain excessive subsidies. This paper develops a Stackelberg ga...
Xin-Tong Chen, Qiangfei Chai, Ze-Lin Wang et al.· Mathematics· 0 citations
Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) has been widely recognized for its role in many decarbonization pathways. Emerging technologies like CCUS are often adopted slowly until the technology matures and the implementation costs fall enough for firms to profit. Government planners can induce earlier adoption of...
The Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) is an ex-ante competition-policy arrangement designed to curb administrative monopolies and local protectionism. Using 30,353 firm-year observations for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2012 to 2023, this study treats the nationwide implementation of the FCRS as a quasi-natura...
Richard E. Haskell, Ning Wen, Jia-Hui Tan· Management System Engineerin...· 0 citations
