How generative AI behaves in the newsvendor problem: a behavioral experimental study

Analyzing and Correcting Benevolence Bias in Large Language Models

Benevolence bias is identified and measure, a small but consistent tendency for aligned LLMs to lean toward the kinder, safer, more socially approved answer on value-laden survey questions, and is easy to diagnose and straightforward to fix.

Reproducing human biases in route choice using large language models: Toward scalable behavioral modeling

Human choice behavior, including route choice, exhibits systematic behavioral biases that deviate from the assumptions of full rationality. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) has been widely recognized as an effective framework for characterizing such behavioral patterns. However, its large-scale application, particularly in simulation and agent-based modeling, critically depends on specifying individual-level CPT parameters, which remain a major bottleneck. Conventional approaches typically rely on surveys and controlled experiments to calibrate CPT parameters, yet these methods are difficult to generalize and often fail to capture the full diversity of human decision-making. To address this challenge, this paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reproduce human behavioral biases in choice-making without explicit specification of prospect-theoretic parameters. Using route choice as a representative scenario, we design a behavioral evaluation framework and systematically compare LLM-generated decisions with established human behavioral patterns predicted by CPT. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs are capable of reproducing non-rational human choice biases and can exhibit decision behaviors consistent with prospect-theoretic effects under uncertainty. These findings suggest that generative AI models may provide a scalable alternative for modeling human decision processes and offer a promising foundation for next-generation large-scale agent-based simulation and AI-driven behavioral research.

How AI Prompts Can Teach Us About the Structure of Human Behavior

Applying the method to 119,147 decisions made by 78,657 subjects from more than 35 countries across 10 classic economic game roles, it is found that human behavior can be closely matched using three dimensions: Risk Aversion, Strategic Sophistication, and Trust.

Empirical Evidence and Analysis of a Critical Pitfall in Reward Learning from Human Feedback

LLMs struggle to simulate human belief updates in controlled environments

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants'actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

The Belief Update Gate: Separating Inertia from Learning in Human-AI Interaction

Repeated human-AI interaction is often analyzed through pooled belief-updating slopes: users observe AI successes and failures, revise reported beliefs in the feedback-consistent direction, but appear conservative on average. We show that such averages can obscure an important distinction between whether an elicited belief report changes at all and how it changes conditional on movement. We refer to this measurement-aware decomposition as the belief update gate. Reanalyzing a multi-task human-AI decision-making dataset with 240 participants, 7,200 trials, and three task domains, we find substantial non-movement in reported beliefs: 67.3% of trial-level belief changes are exactly zero, and 76.4% are smaller than five percentage points. Separating non-moving from moving reports changes the descriptive interpretation of pooled conservatism: the within-trajectory slope rises from 0.494 overall to 0.949 among rows with nonzero movement. Since this latter estimate conditions on observed movement, we interpret it as a descriptive decomposition rather than as evidence of a near-Bayesian latent learning process. Complementary hurdle style analyses (i.e., modeling zero vs. non-zero changes before predicting update magnitude) show that the absolute discrepancy between feedback and entering belief predicts whether a report changes, while the signed feedback discrepancy predicts the direction and magnitude of change among reports that move. Importantly, observed non-movement does not distinguish genuine latent belief inertia from small unexpressed updates, rounding, or other reporting processes. These findings show that calibration analyses of repeated human--AI interaction should distinguish visible non-movement in elicited belief reports from updating conditional on movement rather than treating reported beliefs as a single continuous updating process.