MafiaScope, an open testbed that turns the social deduction game Mafia into a measurement instrument for machine Theory of Mind, is presented, finding that stated confidence is poorly calibrated, agents overestimate how often they are suspected by a factor of 1.5, and single-vote counterfactual replays rarely change game outcomes.
Abstract
An LLM agent's public behaviour reveals little about its social reasoning: an agent that votes correctly may be guessing, and an agent that lies well leaves no trace of what it actually believes. We present MafiaScope, an open testbed that turns the social deduction game Mafia into a measurement instrument for machine Theory of Mind. It distinguishes whether an agent lost because it misread the game or because it failed to act on a correct assessment, a distinction that is invisible from outcomes and dialogue transcripts alone. After every public utterance, each agent privately answers structured probe questions whose responses never re-enter the game and are scored against the ground truth known to the engine. An interactive visualizer replays games from the perspective of an individual agent's beliefs, displays timeline-aligned accuracy and calibration, and supports counterfactual replay from any recorded step. In a case study across two model families comprising tens of thousands of parsed probe responses, we find that stated confidence is poorly calibrated, agents overestimate how often they are suspected by a factor of 1.5, and single-vote counterfactual replays rarely change game outcomes: outcome flips occur primarily when the agent had already formed a correct belief state, whereas decisions made under an incorrect model of the world remain largely unchanged under resampling. The engine, visualizer, recorded games, and counterfactual replay corpus are released under an open-source licence. Code: https://github.com/karpovilia/mafiascope. Live demo: https://karpovilia.github.io/mafiascope/. Screencast: https://vimeo.com/1208920221.
Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.
Zheyuan Liu, Wei-Liang Zhao, Xiangchi Yuan et al.· 0 citations
An auditable framework is built that maintains an external belief state over hidden roles, logs belief updates and belief-action deviations as structured evidence, and supports a defensive offline improvement loop that reviews bad cases before any strategy change.
Yuanpeng Gao, Jiangyi Yang, Yao Zhao et al.· 0 citations
This work tests a hidden-information chess variant where royal status can be secretly, repeatedly relocated between pieces, and where an agent's stated probability distribution over the opponent's hidden royal piece -- elicited every turn, separately from the move it chooses -- is scored against ground truth recoverable after the game.
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed as agents in high-stakes settings, such as medical and legal systems, understanding their deceptive capabilities is fundamental to safety. Controlled social deduction games provide a reproducible proxy for isolating and evaluating these complex adversarial behaviors. We present the open-source benchmark framework ParliamentBench based on the game Secret Hitler to evaluate LLMs in scenarios that require deception, persuasion, and reasoning under information asymmetry. We evaluate 16 LLMs across 1,600 simulated matches playing each other, playing against humans, and compare them against a large set of online games. We introduce three novel metrics that isolate social deduction, reasoning, and deceptive consistency. Our experiments reveal that frontier models achieve strong performance across cooperative and deceptive roles, with a strong top-four cluster (GPT-5.4, Kimi K2.5, Grok 4.1 Fast, and DeepSeek 3.1 Terminus), whereas the weakest models fall short of random (33%) and simple algorithmic (45%) baselines. Most LLMs struggle to maintain a consistent deceptive persona throughout an entire game, with deception retention dropping below 50%.
Niklas Bauer, Lars Benedikt Kaesberg, Akiko Aizawa et al.· 0 citations
As large language models are deployed as autonomous agents that communicate intentions before acting, a critical safety question is whether agents that publicly commit to actions will honor those commitments. We place LLM agents in repeated $n$-player games with a three-stage protocol that separates private intent, public announcement, and final action, allowing us to identify whether each deviation from a stated announcement was already planned during private deliberation. Evaluating three frontier models across six games in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups over 10 rounds, we report two findings. First, when agents deviate from their announcements, the deviation is predominantly already stated in their private plan (exceeding 90% in the highest-deception conditions), yet this is not a fixed model property: the same model ranges from perfect honesty to near-total deviation across games. Second, different models interpret announcements incompatibly, some as binding commitments and others as cheap talk, producing payoff gaps that emerge in Round~0 and persist across all 10 rounds. Systems that combine models from different providers therefore cannot assume shared announcement semantics and require empirical testing of model interactions before deployment.
Jerick Shi, Terry Jingchen Zhang, Bernhard Scholkopf et al.· 0 citations
Strategic depth of reasoning is essential for human interaction of Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in boundedly rational environments. However, existing evaluations are primarily based on canonical games prevalent in pretraining corpora, making it difficult to disentangle true strategic reasoning from memorisation. To address this, we formalise a necessary level-K distinguishability condition for strategic depth inference and construct a suite of novel game structures that meet this standard. Using these games, we evaluate strategic depth in LLMs from both the Chain-of-Thought tokens and actual actions under recursive reasoning and an inductive trace of opponent game-play data. Across experimental trials spanning four LLMs, four game structures, and ten levels of iterated reasoning, we find that model models maintain accurate strategic depth under recursive reasoning, with strong internal consistency between stated reasoning and actions at every level. Errors arise from using the wrong number of iterated depth of reasoning steps, not from computing best responses incorrectly. However, inductive inference from opponent play degrades accuracy sharply and unevenly across games, and explicit strategic mentalizing in the chain of thought substantially improves overall performance.