Transhumanism and human rights: some philosophical and legal questions

Human rights in the context of technological improvement: transhumanism, neurolaw, and morphological freedom as challenges to modern legal doctrine

The article examines the principal philosophical and legal questions arising in connection with the development of the transhumanist movement. It is established that transhumanism, as an intellectual and socio-political movement advocating the radical expansion of human capabilities through technology, poses a qualitatively new challenge to legal science, calling into question the immutability of the human being as a subject of law and undermining the traditional understanding of human nature as the common foundation of equality. The article analyses four new human rights proposed in the context of neurotechnological development – the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity and the right to psychological continuity – and critically evaluates their dual nature: while designed to protect the freedom and privacy of the human mind, they must not become an instrument for legitimising compulsory enhancement. The legal concept of morphological freedom is examined as an independent construct encompassing both the right to restore bodily functions and the right to enhance cognitive and physical capabilities, and it is argued that this right, though a legitimate subject of constitutional and civil law protection, cannot be absolute and requires a clear balance between individual self-determination and the interests of public safety and equality. Special attention is devoted to the phenomenon of «technological inequality» – a new form of inequality rooted not in social conditions but in biological capabilities acquired through technological choice – and its legal implications in the fields of labour law, the right to education and electoral rights. It is concluded that an effective legal response to transhumanism requires the development of a fundamentally new regulatory paradigm based on recognition of morphological freedom combined with the inviolable core of human dignity, prohibition of discrimination against non-enhanced persons, equal access to basic enhancement technologies, and a special legal regime for technologies directly interfering with neural processes.

Law and Morality: An Everlasting Debate

Humanism versus utilitarianism: philosophical and legal foundations of the human rights conflict in crisis situations

The article examines the philosophical and legal conflict between humanism and utilitarianism as two competing ethical and legal paradigms for regulating human rights in crisis situations - during pandemics and states of emergency. The relevance of the topic stems from the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic and the practice of martial law and states of emergency in various countries have revealed a limiting case in which the state is forced to make decisions that directly affect human life, health, and dignity under conditions of scarce resources and time – the allocation of mechanical ventilators, the imposition of lockdowns, and restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly. The author proceeds from the premise that these decisions rest not on a purely medical or technical basis but on a deeper philosophical and legal choice between two types of justification: a utilitarian one, oriented toward maximizing aggregate good for the greatest number of people, and a humanistic (deontological) one, which requires recognizing the dignity of every individual as an absolute value not subject to calculation. The article analyzes the theoretical limits of the utilitarian approach to allocating scarce medical resources during a pandemic, as well as the Kantian deontological critique of this approach from the standpoint of human dignity. It examines the international legal mechanism of derogation from human rights obligations in a state of emergency, enshrined in Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the requirements of proportionality and strict necessity that limit state discretion. The article further explores Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical critique of the risk that a temporary “state of exception” may become a permanent paradigm of governance, blurring the boundary between the rule of law and autocracy. It is concluded that neither paradigm alone can serve as a self-sufficient basis for crisis legal regulation: pure utilitarianism creates a risk of devaluing the dignity of vulnerable population groups, while an absolute deontological approach does not always provide operational criteria for decision-making under conditions of resource scarcity. The article proposes understanding humanism as an external, value-based boundary that limits the permissible utilitarian calculations a state may make during a crisis.

Transhumanism and Posthumanity: A Philosophical Analysis of Ethical and Anthropological Boundaries

This article examines transhumanism as an intellectual and cultural movement aimed at overcoming human biological limitations through technology. It analyzes the term's evolution from mid-20th-century futurological concepts to contemporary philosophical discourse. Particular attention is paid to the concept of «posthumanity» as a hypothetical stage of evolution characterized by a radical break with anthropological constants. The author explores key ethical dilemmas: identity, social inequality, ontological security, and the redefinition of human nature.Based on a comparative analysis of the works of N. Bostrom, F. Fukuyama, D. Haraway, and R. Bray, the author concludes that a normative framework for regulating human enhancement technologies is necessary.

Generations of Human Rights in the Context of the Concept of Solidarity

Introduction: the liberal perception of freedom as a contradiction between its negative and positive aspects formed the basis for dividing human rights into generations. Personal and some political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other hand, are not divided simply into generations, but into levels in terms of their importance for individual freedom. The constitutional legal framework for such classification is based on the opposition between the principles of the rule-of-law state and the social (welfare) state. Purpose: to identify patterns which could allow asserting the need to revise the constitutional legal concept of the generations of human rights in the context of the contemporary view of the relationship between the principles of the “rule-of-law state” and the “social state,” negative and positive freedom, and the constitutional theory of solidarity. Methods: the study is based on general scientific methods, including analysis, synthesis, comparison, description, induction, and deduction, as well as specific scientific methods, including historical legal, comparative legal, formal legal methods, and legal modeling. Results: the division of human rights into generations is based on the approach according to which the first and second generations correspond to negative and positive freedom, respectively. Other criteria for this classification have been seriously criticized in science and refuted by the practice of senior judicial authorities. Nevertheless, constitutional innovations introduced in 2020 essentially eliminate the contradictions between the rule-of-law state and the social state, while the constitutionally proclaimed solidarity ensures the unity of negative and positive freedoms and their interdependence. Conclusions: any human right is the constitutional legal expression of individual freedom, which always has a negative (passive) and positive (active) component. The division of human rights into generations does not correspond to the modern constitutional legal concepts of individual freedom and the system of human rights. Each of the human rights, including “first-generation rights,” is a projection of negative and positive freedom and corresponds to the category “dignified life.”

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA

This article analyzes human rights and the challenges they face in the contemporary era, highlighting their essential role in safeguarding human dignity and promoting peaceful coexistence. It is based on the understanding that human rights are inherent to the human condition, regardless of their formal recognition in domestic or international legal systems, including treaties, conventions, and peremptory norms (ius cogens). The study also addresses the doctrinal distinction between human rights and fundamental rights, emphasizing its primarily didactic nature, as both aim to ensure conditions for a dignified life. Furthermore, the article examines the different dimensions of human rights and stresses that their effectiveness depends on voluntary compliance by individuals, States, and other social actors. In this context, it explores forms of human rights violations and their implications, particularly in light of the inapplicability of traditional principles of public international law, such as reciprocity. Finally, the paper presents, in an illustrative manner, contemporary challenges that may weaken the human rights protection system, including restrictive migration policies, underscoring the need for continuous reflection and strengthening of protection mechanisms at the global level.