Aug 2026· 6 citations· ⚡ 4 influential· 26 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
This work introduces \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average, and leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.
Abstract
Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove this dependence for every finite $N$-player normal-form game under full-information feedback. We introduce \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average. The algorithm is deterministic and fully uncoupled. If $m_{\max}$ denotes the largest action-set size, then, simultaneously for every horizon $T\geq1$, it guarantees that each of the $N$ players in the game incurs regret upper bounded by $O(\textrm{poly}(N, \log m_{\max}))$. Our algorithm leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.
We introduce an uncoupled learning algorithm which, when employed by all players of an arbitrary $N$-player normal form game with up to $K$ actions per player, guarantees $O(N^3\log^2 K)$ individual regret, uniformly over the horizon of play. The proposed algorithm - which we call higher-order optimism with discounting...
Omar Abbadi, R. Laraki, P. Mertikopoulos· 4 citations· ⚡4
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret in self-play, independent of the horizon $T$. With $n$ players and at most $m$ actions each, every player's individual swap regret is $O(\sqrt n\,m\...
We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum matrix games with bandit payoff feedback and observed opponent actions. For games with $d$ actions per player, we develop an algorithm achieving a duality gap of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{d/t})$ with high probability, simultaneously at every round $t...
This work provides what appears to be the first \emph{radically uncoupled} algorithm with sub-exponential convergence guarantees to coarse correlated equilibria in discounted general-sum Markov games without imposing any structural restrictions on the game.
Asrin Efe Yorulmaz, U. Aydın, Tamer Başar· 1 citation
Can simple no-regret dynamics attain smaller regret in self-play than against arbitrary adversaries? In $n$-player general-sum games, Daskalakis et al. 2021 proved an $O(n\log d_i\log^4 T)$ individual regret bound for Optimistic Hedge, which improves upon the classical $O(\sqrt T)$ adversarial regret bound. In this wor...
This work proves that plain Optimistic Hedge with a constant step size can attain individual regret in general-sum games with n players and d=(d_1,\ldots,d_n) actions, under expected loss-vector feedback.
Junsoo Ha· 0 citations
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