A cost-measured map of where a multilingual safety repair can land, and what it costs is found, and it is found it is not a failure to detect harm.
Abstract
Safety alignment in multilingual models is uneven: a model that reliably refuses a harmful request in English will often comply with the same request in a lower-resource language. We trace this gap mechanistically in sarvam, an Indic-multilingual mixture-of-experts reasoning model, and find it is not a failure to detect harm. Harm is encoded as an internal direction that is nearly language-invariant in mid-network (English-vs-Indic cosine ${\approx}0.9$ at $L11$), and steering that direction upstream causally controls refusal. But the detection direction is orthogonal to the change that actually writes the refusal, which is late and assembled over the course of generation rather than read off in a single forward pass. We attribute the write to a specific, localizable circuit, a mixture-of-experts writer held in check by an attention opposer and price every way of intervening on it: damping the opposer is cheap and effective, amplifying the writer is a cost wall, and surgical edits to the responsible heads do nothing. The circuit's organization, and the gradient method that exposes it, recur in a second, unrelated MoE model, while the lever's strength is architecture-specific. The result is a cost-measured map of where a multilingual safety repair can land, and what it costs
Alignment applied after pretraining is shallow in a measurable way: a single direction in a model's residual stream can be edited out, and the model stops refusing harmful requests. That fact says how easily refusal can be removed, not what the refusal decision was reading in the first place. We ask what it reads, and...
The evidence supports an architectural claim: when an LLM forward pass is wrapped in an ontology-mediated auditing, structurally inevitable hallucination can be partially recovered.
Aligned language models fail under two independent pressures: the structural jailbreak class recently formalized as Involuntary In-Context Learning (IICL), which reframes a harmful request as the final missing cell of a data-labeling task completed by pattern rather than judged as content; and the erosion of safety ali...
Safety tooling built on refusal therefore ports to a new architecture by re-estimating the direction at that architecture's write site, not by rebuilding it.
Safety-aligned language models often refuse a harmful request stated directly but answer the same request inside a role-play or narrative wrapper. We measure this vulnerability across languages and registers: attack success on Qwen3-1.7B is already 89.4% in English and 93.0% in modern Chinese, and reaches 95.7% in Clas...
Zhan-Kai Ye, Yan-Ning Wang, Yu-Kai Jin et al.· 0 citations
The authors train 26M-parameter transformers on a synthetic language where recency and rarity are exactly coextensive, and separate them with a minimal causal edit that inverts one cue while holding the truth, token count and answer position fixed.
Yijun Liao, Fan-Wei Liang· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.