It is found that task capability and privacy leakage are fundamentally coupled: more capable models are systematically leakier, with no model in the evaluation able to decouple the two.
Abstract
As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes enterprise settings, understanding how they handle sensitive information in agentic dialogue has become critical. Privacy leakage in such settings requires reasoning about whether information flows respect the contextual norms under which they originated. We extend CIMemories to CIMEMORIES DIALOGUE, a benchmark of 4,410 two-agent dialogue instances grounded in Contextual Integrity theory. Using this benchmark, we systematically evaluate 7 open-weight models from the Qwen3 and Llama 3.1 families across conversation lengths of 1 and 6 turns under three prompting conditions. We find that task capability and privacy leakage are fundamentally coupled: more capable models are systematically leakier, with no model in our evaluation able to decouple the two. Thinking models consistently leak more than their non-thinking counterparts, a pattern we attribute to the extended reasoning surface created by chain-of-thought. Leakage compounds with conversation length, rising up to 3x from 1 to 6 turns. Our results suggest that the coupling between task capability and privacy leakage is not an artifact of misconfiguration but a structural feature of current agentic systems.
LLM agents are becoming increasingly capable of handling daily workspace tasks by interacting with application environments through tool calls. However, as agents read and write sensitive user data across email, documents, and other applications, a central privacy question is whether they preserve contextual integrity...
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Reliable evaluation is a critical bottleneck in privacy red-teaming of large language models (LLMs): determining whether a jailbreak response actually reveals personal information can be difficult when disclosures are indirect, contextual, partial, or obfuscated. Existing evaluation approaches increasingly rely on guar...
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PrivDrift is introduced, a benchmark for auditing whether user-disclosed secrets remain recoverable after conversational topic drift and persuasion-based probing, suggesting that privacy risk in active LLM contexts should be evaluated as a persistent behavioral failure mode rather than only as training-data memorizatio...
A benchmark that measures whether an honest-but-curious recipient can infer a user's sensitive attributes from an LLM's reply on routine task is introduced, and it is found that inferential leakage substantially exceeds direct leakage across models and prompts.
Peng Huang, Yi-Wei Fu, Luo-Xi Meng et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) deployed as conversational agents are increasingly expected to follow procedural logic. While factual hallucination has received extensive attention, a different failure mode has been overlooked: procedural hallucination, in which an agent produces individually fluent and factually plausibl...
This work introduces the SAST-IR (Stateful Attacker, Stateless Target - Iterative Refinement) framework, and introduces the CP-Agent (Cognitive Persuasion Agent), an enhanced diagnosis-guided agent to rigorously evaluate the ``cold-start''defense capabilities of SOTA models.