Nonnaturalism and the Ineffability of Moral Normativity

Abstract

Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnaturalist’s notion of normativity is illusory, I argue that a more benign explanation is available that fits well with the general tenor of nonnaturalism and that explains a number of puzzling observations about the state of the metaethical debate. This explanation is that morality’s normativity is ineffable. I also argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, my strategy for redeeming the nonnaturalist does not commit her to the quietist view that nothing sensible can be said about moral normativity. While the ineffability of moral normativity precludes an informative literal characterization, there remains the possibility of using metaphors to communicate usefully about moral normativity.