Jan 2026· Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society· Vol 62, pp. 52 - 73· 0 citations· 23 references
Abstract
Abstract:The standard interpretation of Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief” is that it is supposed to be an argument for the superiority of science as a method of fixing beliefs. But the standard interpretation gives no explanation for why tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning are the rivals, and these supposed rivals are never really refuted: tenacity is frankly better at fixing beliefs than the fallibilistic scientific method. Even worse, Peirce seems to cheat by judging science by a different standard. I propose instead that “Fixation” was written for an audience who was already pro-science and that the supposed rivals are instead vivid illustrations of what science is not. Furthermore, I propose that Peirce is again trying to take James’s advice to make his thoughts more accessible, this time by using a dialectical argument as a heuristic devise for a popular audience who might already know some Hegel. A dialectical interpretation can solve the problems generated by the standard interpretation: why these rivals, why no refutations, and why science is judged differently. Lastly, I suggest that Peirce was trying to out-Hegel the Hegelians by using their own beloved dialectic to show the superiority of the scientific method.
Two debates in the analytic philosophy of literature have run in parallel: one asks how literary criticism can be rational when critical reasons neither entail nor inductively support the readings they back (Isenberg, Sibley); the other asks whether literature has cognitive value, and is stalled on a dilemma, since ext...
Blake Roeber’s
Political Humility
is a wonderful piece of work; it’s clear and accessible enough that I’d expect a general educated audience with no philosophical background to profitably read all but the last two chapters (which get more into the epistemological weeds than the earlier parts of the book), while sti...
Daniel Greco· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
This paper clarifies the methodology of my book,
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(OUP, 2024). The book aims to dispose of external world skepticism without building or appealing to epistemological theory. John Greco urges this can’t be done. In response, this paper clarifies what is meant by “epistemological the...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 1 citation
This paper evaluates a certain kind of response to philosophical scepticism that is broadly inspired by Wittgenstein’s discussion in On Certainty (OC). Special attention is paid to the idea that we show our certainty and belief in particular assumptions through our actions, practices, and language-games, and that due t...
The article examines various interpretations in 18th-century philosophy of Locke’s supposition that matter could think. According to Locke, since there is no contradiction between the ideas of matter and thought, we cannot, by our own faculties and without revelation, know whether the Creator has endowed certain system...
Maksim D. Evstigneev· Voprosy filosofii· 0 citations
The article argues that knowledge is shaped not only by objective regularities and formal logical possibilities but also by a wide range of factors external to theory – social, cultural, and ideological. The author claims that the conceptions of scientific method, rationality, and professional virtues of the scientist,...
L. Tukhvatulina· Voprosy filosofii· 0 citations
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