The Dialectic of “The Fixation of Belief”

Abstract

Abstract:The standard interpretation of Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief” is that it is supposed to be an argument for the superiority of science as a method of fixing beliefs. But the standard interpretation gives no explanation for why tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning are the rivals, and these supposed rivals are never really refuted: tenacity is frankly better at fixing beliefs than the fallibilistic scientific method. Even worse, Peirce seems to cheat by judging science by a different standard. I propose instead that “Fixation” was written for an audience who was already pro-science and that the supposed rivals are instead vivid illustrations of what science is not. Furthermore, I propose that Peirce is again trying to take James’s advice to make his thoughts more accessible, this time by using a dialectical argument as a heuristic devise for a popular audience who might already know some Hegel. A dialectical interpretation can solve the problems generated by the standard interpretation: why these rivals, why no refutations, and why science is judged differently. Lastly, I suggest that Peirce was trying to out-Hegel the Hegelians by using their own beloved dialectic to show the superiority of the scientific method.