Who Knows? On Schelling’s Monism

Abstract

This article argues that when viewed as the culmination of an evolving project, Schelling’s monism ought to be understood as an existence monism as opposed to a priority monism. It makes this case through an analysis of the young Schelling’s relationship to Neoplatonism and Spinozism. After presenting Naomi Fisher’s case for reading Schelling as a priority monist inspired by the Neoplatonists it argues that the themes of eternity and duration in Spinoza’s Ethics provide Schelling the framework for defeating what he calls the “subjectivization” of reason in the 1804 System of Philosophy. This defeat is accomplished by the elimination of any ontological distinction between who knows, what is known, and knowledge itself. The elimination of these distinctions entails a form of existence monism without need for the Neoplatonic dynamics of procession and return. The article concludes with some implications of the defense of existence monism provided therein regarding the transition from Schelling’s system of identity to his system of freedom.