The neglected argument about C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticism

Abstract

This article examines Peirce’s pragmaticism from the perspective of his own retrospective assessments of his work. Taking seriously Peirce’s self-criticisms and later reformulations, the paper argues that the development of pragmatism cannot be adequately understood through isolated maxims or fragmentary readings, but only in connection with the systematic architecture of his philosophy. Given the still incomplete chronological organization of Peirce’s writings, the study adopts a reconstructive methodology that seeks to reestablish conceptual continuity among dispersed texts. On this basis, under the name of a neglected argument concerning Peirce’s pragmaticism, the article revisits the transition from the early formulation of the pragmatic maxim to its later reformulations, showing that this movement is inseparable from the place of the normative sciences in Peirce’s thought. The analysis suggests that the mature meaning of pragmaticism, in its evolutionary version, depends on its grounding in the categories and on the articulated relation among aesthetics, ethics, and logic.