Owner Dominance, Conflicts of Interest, and Credit Governance in Regional Government Owned BPR: An Assessment of POJK Number 9 of 2024 Through the Bank Daerah Lamongan Case

Abstract

This article examines how local-government ownership of BPR Perseroda may create governance risks in credit decision-making and assesses whether the current regulatory architecture provides adequate safeguards against conflicts of interest and informal owner influence. Bank Daerah Lamongan (BDL) is used only as a case illustration, not as proof of shareholder intervention or of a causal relationship between ownership and non-performing loans. Using normative legal research with statutory and conceptual approaches, the study reads POJK Number 9 of 2024 together with related rules on anti-fraud, AML/CFT, maximum lending limits, related-party transactions, risk management, compliance, and internal audit. The analysis distinguishes formal independence from substantive independence and develops operational indicators such as approval override, undocumented instructions, failure to abstain, retaliation, exceptions from credit policy, and weaknesses in audit trails. The study finds that the main normative gap lies not in the absence of governance duties, but in the evidentiary and procedural mechanisms needed to detect and respond to informal influence. It recommends proportionate communication logs, conflict screening, independent review, protected reporting, and supervisory access to relevant records. The study does not assess actual BDL loan files, supervisory findings, or the legality of any individual credit decision.