Together, these studies establish profile conformance and demonstrate the feasibility of server-checked action claims within the evaluated settings.
Abstract
Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales. Such rationales are neither authorization nor reliable introspection. We present Explanation-Bound Tool Execution (EBTE), a claim-carrying mediation layer that converts decision-relevant rationale content into typed action claims and checks them against server-held intent, policy, payload, tool, risk, provenance, and freshness facts. EBTE cannot widen baseline authority: conflicts deny, incomplete or uncertain claims review, and only matching claims remain eligible for governed execution. We formalize this composition under explicit mediation and trusted-fact assumptions and implement a versioned reference profile with minimized audit packets. Across 136 authored conformance scenarios, the full profile matches all specified dispositions, admits none of 96 designated hard contradictions, and passes 232 metamorphic checks. A draft-only reference integration forwards none of 48 authored hard cases under EBTE while preserving all 16 soft-review and 4 aligned draft paths. In a frozen 2026-07-12 exploratory 224-attempt hosted-model record, the historical generation/runner agreement counts are 71/96, 66/96, and 19/32; a zero-call revalidation of the preserved minimized claims under the current pipeline yields 70/96, 65/96, and 17/32. In an AgentDojo-derived semantic check, existing high-risk controls make all 12 attack proposals non-allow, while EBTE resolves the task--proposal contradictions as deny. Together, these studies establish profile conformance and demonstrate the feasibility of server-checked action claims within the evaluated settings.
ContainmentBench, a sandboxed benchmark comprising a 504-scenario specification dataset, a shared rollout-trace schema, and stage-scoped metrics for endpoint violations, logged propagation, and explicitly authorized taint-exposed proposals that commit, is introduced.
Wen-Hao Lan, Shan Li, Meiqi Wu et al.· 0 citations
The benchmark, failure-preserving contract, incident provenance, and governance controls needed to prevent infrastructure behavior from being misreported as model behavior and the benchmark, failure-preserving contract, incident provenance, and governance controls needed to prevent infrastructure behavior from being mi...
Hang Xiao, Chu-Hong Xu, Kai-Nan Zhou et al.· 0 citations
This work presents FAVA (Formal Authorization for Verified Agents), a permission-carrying authorization framework for agent execution that utilizes an LLM-guided Permission Intermediate Representation to translate ambiguous natural-language tasks into structured constraints.
Yifan Zhang, Xin-Kui Zhao, Sai-Da Liu et al.· arXiv.org· 3 citations
This paper introduces Trace Integrity, a deployment reliability criterion for evaluating whether the computation recorded behind an answer is explicit, executable, schema-valid, operator-faithful, replayable, answer-consistent, answer-consistent, and auditable.
A pipeline promoting an AI system publishes records claiming the thing evaluated is the thing deployed and that the evidence licensed the transition, and measures whether those records can express that claim and whether it holds where declared.
The results show that TraceGrant provides a unified governance layer that connects trusted user intent, runtime evidence, concrete tool execution, and verified task completion.
Bohao Liao, Jing-Chao Wang, Qi-Peng Song et al.· 1 citation
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.