Aug 2026· Artificial Intelligence and Law· 0 citations· 62 references
TL;DR
It is found that at least for the time being, explicit normative instructions are not fully able to realign AI advice with the normative convictions of the population, or the legislator deciding on its behalf.
Abstract
Recent advances in AI make it conceivable to delegate legal decision-making to machines, or to enhance human adjudication through AI assistance. Using classic normative conflicts — the trolley problem and comparable moral dilemmas — as a proof of concept, we examine the alignment between AI legal reasoning and human judgment. In our baseline experiment, we find a pronounced mismatch between decisions made by GPT and those of human subjects. This misalignment raises substantive concerns for AI-powered legal decision-aids. We investigate whether explicit normative guidance can address this misalignment, with mixed results. is susceptible to such intervention, but frequently refuses to decide when faced with a moral dilemma. is outright utilitarian, and essentially ignores the instruction to decide on deontological grounds. faithfully implements this instruction, but is unwilling to balance deontological and utilitarian concerns if instructed to do so. We replicate the experiment with four LLMs from different providers. comes closest to human respondents. is most sensitive to normative instructions. and have a strong utilitarian bias, and do not strongly respond to normative interventions. At least for the time being, explicit normative instructions are not fully able to realign AI advice with the normative convictions of the population, or the legislator deciding on its behalf.
The Stoic concept of the hegemonikon—the capacity for assent that directs the mind—is used as a framework for understanding intellectual creation and decision-making, clarifying when AI supports human judgment and when it replaces decision-making authority.
Christos A. Koutsotasios, Elias Vavouras· Dianoesis· 0 citations
It is concluded that only by grounding oversight in realistic assumptions about human cognition and institutional incentives can it fulfill its intended role in ensuring trustworthy AI.
A. Henestrosa, A. Grinbaum, Ivan P. Yamshchikov· 0 citations
It is found that even when AI is fully explainable and used only to support human judges, it significantly reduces perceived fairness compared to human-only decisions and with a lack of human involvement and when decisions are non-explainable.
H. L. Bentsen, M. Johannesson· Journal of Law & Empiric...· 0 citations
It is concluded that, while AI may be considered a valuable tool for supporting human moral deliberation, it cannot by itself serve as an expert moral decision-maker.
This paper analyzes how AI could persuade humans in key settings toward decisions that compromise the development, containment, oversight, and governance of AI itself, and provides a blueprint for assessing the associated risks.
Joshua H. Levy, Mick Yang, Kellin Pelrine· 0 citations