An LLM agent calling a production API cannot distinguish a query that matched nothing from a query the server did not understand, and what predicts which one occurred, and what it does to the agent.
Abstract
An LLM agent calling a production API cannot distinguish a query that matched nothing from a query the server did not understand. Both return HTTP 200 with a parsable body, no exception to catch and no field to branch on. We ask what predicts which one occurred, and what it does to the agent. Auditing 721,320 parameters across 2,501 independently published OpenAPI documents, we find that 7.5% declare an enumeration and 15.2% declare any machine-checkable constraint at all, while 40.1% of documents state at least one constraint in prose that their schema does not encode. Executing 219 schema-derived perturbations against live commercial endpoints from 27 vendors, reached through a single aggregation layer (Monid) that publishes a schema and returns a run identifier for every call, we find that constraint form, not vendor identity, predicts honesty: machine-checkable constraints yielded an honest error in 111 of 111 cases, prose-only constraints failed silently in 44 of 61 (p = 2e-13). Twelve models across eight families then met these endpoints on ordinary tasks. A vocabulary that the description merely exemplifies was missed by every model on 88 of 88 attempts, while vocabularies written out in full were used correctly 88 to 91% of the time. Running the full agent loop, models detected the resulting silent failure in 12% of cases, repaired it in 0%, asserted a false negative to the user in 41%, and invented a figure in 12%. Promoting the vocabulary into the schema removes the failure, from 88 of 88 to 0 of 89. The fix is one line of schema rather than a better model. Code, schemas, perturbation sets, agent transcripts and per-call run identifiers are released at https://github.com/Jasper0122/silentprobe.
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