Skip to content
Open access

Beyond Substance: Contemporary Science and the Case for a Generative Relational Ontology

Aug 2026 · Philosophies · Vol 11, pp. 147 · 0 citations · 29 references

Abstract

Contemporary science has achieved extraordinary explanatory and predictive success, yet its ontological interpretation remains unsettled. This paper argues that one source of this instability lies in the inherited assumption that reality is fundamentally composed of independently existing substances. While this picture was historically fruitful, it has become increasingly difficult to sustain as a general ontology in light of three converging pressures: the relational and structural character of modern physics, the problem of emergence across levels of organization and the unresolved status of consciousness within physicalist metaphysics. The paper first examines why substance ontology has become unstable as an implicit background framework for scientific interpretation. It then argues that existing post-substance approaches, including ontic structural realism, relational interpretations of physics and process ontology, each capture important aspects of the required shift and contain important resources for moving beyond substance ontology. The present paper does not attempt to adjudicate these traditions as a whole. It instead identifies a specific generative requirement: an adequate post-substance ontology must explain how stable physical, organizational and experiential domains can be jointly situated within a common ontological framework. This requirement is identified as a generative gap in the argument developed here. In response, the paper argues that a post-substance ontology must be not only structural, relational or processual but generative. It must explain how effective objects stabilize, how levels of organization arise, how spacetime coordination becomes available, and how physical structure and conscious experience can belong to the same reality without reduction or fragmentation. The paper develops a generative-projection hypothesis that takes the derivative status of spacetime as its point of entry and introduces a generative domain, projection, invariance and compatibility as conceptual tools for articulating this ontological direction. The hypothesis is presented as preliminary rather than as a completed metaphysical system.

Read PDF

Similar papers

Open access Oct 2026

Why There Must Be Both Something and Nothing: Binary Model of Reality, Complexity, and the Limits of Explanation

The question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” has occupied philosophers for centuries and remains one of the fundamental problems of metaphysics. This article approaches the question through the relationship between being and non-being, bringing this classical metaphysical problem into dialogue with contem...

Mariusz Stanowski · 0 citations
Open access Sep 2026

Informational self meaning as a structural theory in artificial intelligence ontology and epistemology

This paper introduces the concept of informational self-meaning (ISM) as a philosophical account for addressing AI ontology and epistemology, providing a conceptual foundation for gradualist models of AI recognition in legal and ethical contexts.

Jae-Eung Yu · 0 citations
Open access Oct 2026

Absolute Nothingness: Toward an Ontology Beyond Not-Being

Purpose: This article aims to establish that Nothingness and not-being constitute distinct ontological categories despite their frequent conceptual association within the Western philosophical tradition. It proposes an understanding of Nothingness as a prior and non-contingent ontological condition that enables the pos...

H. Godínez · 0 citations
Book Sep 2026

Having Meanings in View

The book lays the groundwork for a novel account of rule-following which is both philosophically substantive and partially reductive. The account the book proposes is philosophically substantive in contrast with the kind of discourses that exemplify a quietist approach to philosophy. It is partially reductive inasmuc...

Arnaud Petit · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.