A leakage analysis of each projection is given, an incident in which a first-cut projection preserved the identifier it was written to remove is reported, and the residual trust the design does not eliminate is given.
Abstract
A system that authorizes an action must see enough of it to decide, and a system that attests to its decision must record enough to be audited. Both pressures push raw action parameters -- recipients, payment memos, record identifiers -- into an append-only ledger that cannot delete them. We show the two are separable. We classify each parameter field, not each action class, into three tiers: fields a policy may legitimately match on, which cross raw; fields that are policy-relevant but identifying, which cross only as projections such as an email domain or a templated route shape; and fields with no legitimate policy use, which never leave the workload. The central property is that the ledger's commitment is a canonical digest of the full, unminimized parameters, computed before minimization runs. The commitment is therefore independent of the tier table: reclassifying a field changes what is disclosed without invalidating a historical entry, reopening a hash, or altering what an offline verifier checks. Tier table, policy schema and wire schema are generated from one per-action declaration, so the deciding and recording parties cannot hold different rules. We then address a question the architecture forces: which party should compute each attested fact? We argue it is settled by which party could lie about it undetectably, and derive three answers within one request -- the client computes the parameter digest, being the only party holding the data; it is structurally prevented from naming the definition that governed it, since that would write a false statement into a signed ledger; and it attests which tier table it applied, so divergence is detectable. We give a leakage analysis of each projection, report an incident in which a first-cut projection preserved the identifier it was written to remove, and state the residual trust the design does not eliminate.
It is argued that agent security must be evaluated under an untrusted-model assumption: a correct system is one in which a fully prompt-injected agent still cannot exceed the authority explicitly delegated to it, and an authorization broker is implemented that closes the gap.
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Two robustness notions are formalized, each mechanism by ablation is validated by ablation, and how often the multi-source precondition holds on sanctions designations and software supply-chain provenance is measured.
Anmol Pandey, A. Jain, Liang-Wei Chen et al.· 0 citations
A-VIP (AP2 Verified-Intent Protection), a protocol-layer defense that treats the signed intent as a capability grant rather than judging the merchant's description, is introduced, to address this attack vector.
Yedidel Louck, Amit Dvir, Ariel Stulman· 0 citations
KITA is presented, a review-to-authorization architecture that keeps the user's personal secret signing key and every threshold signing-key share outside all LLM processes and establishes execution-bound authorization integrity.
The resulting research prototype binds each deterministic policy decision to the exact policy source, commits a privacy-minimizing record at a caller-selected synchronization boundary, and returns an Ed25519-signed receipt that states whether that boundary completed.
This paper defines an authorization envelope of eight fields drawn from the delegated-authority literature and from the control primitives of existing payment rails, comprising a per-transaction ceiling, a cumulative ceiling, a merchant set, a category set, required product attributes, a validity window, a substitution...
Ian Staley· Journal of Artificial Intell...· 0 citations
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