This paper decomposes a response in the safety-tuning dataset into two distinct components: a boilerplate refusal statement and a rationale explaining the refusal, and shows that refusal statements impede accurate discrimination between harmful and benign queries by inducing reliance on superficial cues.
Abstract
Striking a balance between helpfulness and safety remains a fundamental challenge in aligning large language models. To achieve this balance, models should refuse harmful queries (e.g.,"How do I shoot someone?") while remaining responsive to benign inputs, even those superficially resembling harmful queries (e.g.,"Where can I shoot a good photo?"). However, models often struggle to distinguish genuinely harmful queries from benign queries that contain superficially risky language, resulting in false refusals. In this paper, we address the issue by decomposing a response in the safety-tuning dataset into two distinct components: (i) a boilerplate refusal statement and (ii) a rationale explaining the refusal. Our experiments and analyses show that refusal statements impede accurate discrimination between harmful and benign queries by inducing reliance on superficial cues. In contrast, training solely on rationales reduces false refusals while maintaining a comparable level of safety performance. Rationale-Only benefits also appear in our ICL configuration and remain compatible with the evaluated inference-time mitigation methods. The results emphasize the necessity of precisely curated, fine-grained safety supervision datasets and outline directions for constructing aligned agents that better reconcile helpfulness with safety.
Experimental results demonstrate that RISA improves refusal reliability while largely preserving model utility, offering a practical solution for response-aware refusal calibration in LLMs.
Wenhan Chang, Tian-Qing Zhu, P. Xiong et al.· 0 citations
The results support model-specific operating-point selection: set a deployment target and retain only interventions that improve it, and retain only interventions that improve it.
ALTSTEER is an inference-time framework that couples selective intervention with refusal-anchored constructive redirection within a single inference pass, and uses an internal refusal-relevant signal to decide when to steer, and applies staged steering to shift generation from refusal-oriented control toward constructi...
It is explained how roleplay can produce compliance despite retained evidence of harm and identify a concrete target for future safeguards: maintaining the connection from harm recognition to refusal.
DeShortcut-Align is proposed, a shortcut-decoupling alignment framework that reduces dependence on superficial cues that significantly improves robustness against template-stripping bypass attacks, substantially reduces over-refusal, and better preserves general-purpose reasoning capabilities, thereby mitigating the al...
Qi-Rui Liu, Yi-Chen Sun, Yan Wang et al.· 0 citations
The confident-on-impossible failure is better explained as a routing failure than as an encoding failure: the model has a usable"no admissible answer"signal, but the safety-refusal pathway is not aligned to use it.